November 4, 1904.] 



SCIENCE. 



599 



logic are. These I wish now to state in a 

 somewhat more systematic way. 



The basal problem of logic becomes, un- 

 doubtedly, the metaphysics of knowledge, 

 the determination of the nature of knowl- 

 edge and its relation to reality. It is quite 

 evident that this is just the problem which 

 the current tendencies criticized have 

 sought, not to solve, but to avoid or set 

 aside. Their motives for so doing have 

 been mainly the difficulties which have 

 arisen from the Kantian philosophy in its 

 development into transcendentalism, and 

 the desire to extend the category of evolu- 

 tion to embrace the whole of reality, knowl- 

 edge included. I confess to feeling the 

 force of these motives as strongly as any 

 advocate of the criticized opinions. But 

 I do not see my way clear to satisfying 

 them by denying or explaining away the 

 evident character of knowledge itself. It 

 appears far better to admit that a meta- 

 physics of knowledge is as yet hopeless, 

 rather than so to transform knowledge as 

 to get rid of the problem; for we must 

 ultimately ask after the truth of the trans- 

 formation. But I am far from believing 

 that a metaphysics of knowledge is hope- 

 less. The biological tendencies themselves 

 seem to furnish us with much material for 

 at least the beginnings of one. Reality 

 known is to be set over against reality un- 

 known or independent of knowledge, not 

 as image to original, idea to thing, phe- 

 nomena to noumena, appearance to reality ; 

 but reality as known is a new stage in the 

 development of reality itself. It is not an 

 external mind which knows reality by 

 means of its own ideas, but reality itself 

 becomes known through its own expanding 

 and readjusting processes. So far I am in 

 entire agreement with the tendencies I have 

 criticised. But what change is effected by 

 this expansion and readjustment? I can 

 find no other answer than this simple one : 

 the change to knowledge. And by this I 



mean to assert unequivocally that the addi- 

 tion of knowledge to a reality hitherto 

 without it, is simply an addition to it and 

 not a transformation of it. Such a view 

 may appear to make knowledge a wholly 

 useless addition, but I see no inherent 

 necessity in such a conclusion. Nor do I 

 see any inherent necessity of supposing 

 that knowledge must be a useful addition. 

 Yet I would not be so foolish as to deny 

 the usefulness of knowledge. We have, of 

 course, the most palpable evidences of its 

 use. As we examine them, I think we 

 find, without exception, that knowledge is 

 useful just in proportion as we find that 

 reality is not transformed by being known. 

 If it really were transformed in that proc- 

 ess, could anything else than confusion re- 

 sult from the multitude of knowing indi- 

 viduals ? 



To me, therefore, the metaphysics of the 

 situation resolves itself into the realistic 

 position, that a developing reality develops, 

 under ascertainable conditions, into a 

 known reality without undergoing any 

 other transformation, and that this new 

 stage marks an advance in the efficiency 

 of reality in its adaptations. My confi- 

 dence steadily grows that this whole proc- 

 ess can be scientifically worked out. It is 

 impossible here to justify my confidence in 

 detail, and I must leave the matter with 

 the following suggestion. The point from 

 which knowledge starts and to which it 

 ultimately returns, is always some portion 

 of reality where there is consciousness, the 

 things, namely, which, we are wont to say, 

 are in consciousness. These things are not 

 ideas representing other things outside of 

 consciousness, but real things, which, by 

 being in consciousness, have the capacity 

 of representing each other, of standing for 

 or implying each other. Knowledge is not 

 the creation of these implications, but their 

 successful systematization. It will be 

 found, I think, that this general statement 



