626 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XX. No. 515. 



The psychological conception assumes 

 that, whether or not the organic conception 

 be true and of scientific importance, it fails 

 to get to the bottom of things. It assumes 

 that, even if society is an organism, there 

 is necessarily some interaction of individual 

 with individual, or some form of activity 

 common to all individuals that serves to 

 bind them together in helpful and pleasur- 

 able relations, and that this activity, in- 

 stead of being merely physical, like the co- 

 hesion of material cells, is a mental phe- 

 nomenon. It assumes that all social bonds 

 may be resolved into some common activity 

 or some interactivity of individual minds. 

 It is, in short, a view of society as a mode 

 of mental activity. 



This is the psychological conception in 

 general terms. It takes, however, four 

 specific forms in attempting to answer the 

 question : What definite mode of mental 

 action is the most elementary form of the 

 social relation? 



According to the most pretentious of 

 these answers, one that dates back to 

 Epicurus, and lies at the basis of all the 

 covenant or social contract theories of 

 political philosophy, the psychological 

 origin of society is found in a perception 

 of the utility of association. It assumes 

 that men consciously and purposely create 

 social relations to escape the ills of a 

 'state of nature' and to reap the rewards 

 of cooperation. This rationalistic theory 

 offers a true explanation of highly artificial 

 forms of social organization in a civil, 

 especially an industrial, state, but it throws 

 no light upon the nature of elemental, 

 spontaneous cooperation. For this we 

 inust turn to the other three conceptions 

 — all of them, I venture to think, modern- 

 ized forms of certain very ancient notions. 



According to one of these, the most ele- 

 mentary social fact is seen in the constrain- 

 ing power, the impression, the contagious 

 influence that an aggregation, a mass, of 



living beings, exerts upon each individual 

 mind. Society is thus viewed as a phe- 

 nomenon closely allied to suggestion and 

 hypnosis. This view of society is most 

 fully set forth in the writings of Durkheim 

 and Le Bon. 



A third conception, identified with the 

 life-work of our lamented colleague, Ga- 

 briel Tarde, assumes that impression, con- 

 tagion, influence, as forms of the inter- 

 action of mind with mind, may themselves 

 be accounted for. It explains them as 

 modes of example and imitation. All so- 

 ciety is thus resolved into products of imi- 

 tation. 



In strict psychological analysis these 'im- 

 pression' and 'imitation' theories must be 

 classed, I think, as scientifically developed 

 forms of the 'sympathy' theories of society, 

 that may be traced back through the liter- 

 ature. of political philosophy to very early 

 days. They offer proximate explanations 

 of the great social facts of resemblance, of 

 mutuality, of solidarity; but do they, be- 

 yond a doubt, trace concerted activity back 

 to its absolute origin? Above all, do they 

 account not only for similarity, but also for 

 variation, for the differentiation of com- 

 munities into leaders and followers, for 

 competition as well as for combination, for 

 liberty as well as for solidarity? 



The fourth conception, put forth some 

 years ago by the present writer, should be 

 classed as a developed form of the instinct 

 theory, dating back to Aristotle's aphorism 

 that man is a political animal. It assumes 

 that the most elementary form of social 

 relationship is discovered in the very be- 

 ginning of mental phenomena. In its 

 simplest form mental activity is a response 

 of sensitive matter to a stimulus. Any 

 given stimulus may happen to be felt by 

 more than one organism, at the same or 

 at different times. Two or more organisms 

 may respond to the same given stimulus 

 simultaneously or at different times. They 



