November 11, 1904.] 



SCIENCE. 



627 



may respond to the same given stimulus in 

 like or in unlike ways; in the same or in 

 different degrees; with like or with unlike 

 promptitude; with equal or with unequal 

 persistence. I have attempted to show 

 that in like response to the same given 

 stimulus we have the beginning, the abso- 

 lute origin, of all concerted activity— the 

 inception of every conceivable form of co- 

 operation ; while in unlike response, and in 

 unequal response, we have the beginning 

 of all those processes of individuation, of 

 differentiation, of competition, which, in 

 their endlessly varied relations to combina- 

 tion, to cooperation, bring about the infi- 

 nite complexity of organized social life. 



It is unnecessary to argue that this con- 

 ception of society not only takes account 

 of individuality as well as of mutuality, 

 but that also it carries our interpretation 

 of solidarity farther back than the theories 

 of impression and of imitation, since both 

 impression and imitation must be account- 

 ed for— in ultimate psychological analysis 

 — as phenomena of reciprocal, or inter- 

 stimulation and response. Indeed, the 

 very language that Tarde uses throughout 

 his exposition tacitly assumes as much. 

 Example is stimulus, the imitative act is 

 response to stimulus. The impression that 

 the crowd makes upon an individual is 

 stimulus, and the submission, obedience or 

 conformity of the individual is response to 

 stimulus. Moreover, the formation of the 

 crowd itself has to be accounted for, and 

 it will be found that, in many cases, the 

 formation of a crowd is nothing more nor 

 less than the simultaneous like-response of 

 many individuals to some inciting event, 

 circumstance or suggestion. In short, im- 

 pression, imitation and conformity are 

 specific modes, but not by any means the 

 primary or simplest modes, of stimulation 

 and response; and some of the most im- 

 portant phenomena of concerted action can 

 be explained only as springing directly 



from primary like-responses, before either 

 imitation or impression has entered into 

 the process. 



This conception meets one further scien- 

 tific test. It offers a simple and consistent 

 view of the relation between social life and 

 the material universe. It assumes that 

 the original causes of society lie in the 

 material environment, which may be re- 

 garded as an infinitely differentiated group 

 of stimuli of like-response, and, therefore, 

 of collective action; while the products of 

 past social life, constituting the historical 

 tradition, become in their turn secondary 

 stimuli, or secondary causes, in the social 

 process. 



A mere momentary like-response by any 

 number of individuals is the beginning of 

 social phenomena, but it does not consti- 

 tute a society. Before society can exist 

 there must be continuous exposure to like 

 influences, and repeated reaction upon 

 them. When this happens, the individuals 

 thus persistently acting in like ways become 

 themselves mentally and practically alike. 

 But likeness is not identity. The degrees 

 of resemblance or of difference in the man- 

 ner of response to common stimuli manifest 

 themselves as distinguishable types of mind 

 and of character in the aggregate of indi- 

 viduals; while the differing degrees of 

 promptitude and persistency in response 

 have as their consequence a differentiation 

 of the aggregate into leaders and followers, 

 those that assume initiative and responsi- 

 bility, and those that habitually look for 

 guidance. These differences and resem- 

 blances have subjective consequences. Dif- 

 fering individuals become aware of their 

 differences, resembling individuals become 

 aware of their resemblances, and the con- 

 sciousness of kind so engendered becomes 

 thenceforth a potent factor in further so- 

 cial evolution. 



Summarizing our analysis to this point, 

 we may say that we conceive of society as 



