December 9, 1904.] 



SCIENCE. 



789 



neous senses; although here, doubtless, 

 there is much steady work, rank and file 

 work, yet to be done. We know something 

 of the organic complex concerned in active 

 touch, and something of the static sense. 

 On the other hand, of the organic sensa- 

 tions in general we know practically noth- 

 ing. Here then, as I take it, lies the imme- 

 diate sense problem for experimental psy- 

 chology. When we remember the impor- 

 tance of organic sensation in the affective 

 life, its importance as the vehicle of sen- 

 sory judgments in psychophysical work, 

 the part it plays in the mechanism of mem- 

 ory and recognition or in the motives to 

 action, its importance for the primary per- 

 ception of self;- when Ave remember the 

 widespread character of the organic reac- 

 tion set up by any sensory stimulus; when 

 we realize that some psychological systems 

 have recourse to it from beginning to end, 

 while others (Wundt's recent ' Grundzuge ' 

 is an example) practically ignore it; when 

 we remember that certain questions of 

 prime systematic importance hinge upon 

 it — the question of the duality of the con- 

 scious elements, of the relative range of 

 sensation and image, of what is called 

 affective memory, and so on : we can hardly 

 fail to see that here is a great gap in our 

 psychological knowledge, the filling of 

 which calls for a persistent application of 

 the experimental method. Of all problems 

 in the psychology of sense that are now 

 before us, the problem of the number, 

 nature and laws of connection of the or- 

 ganic sensations appears to me to be the 

 most pressing. 



In the domain of psychophysics, I see 

 no single problem of supreme import, but 

 rather a need for patient, continuous work 

 by the methods already formulated. The 

 inherent aim of psychophysical investiga- 

 tion is, as I have said, the determination 

 of the psychophysical constants. Now it 

 is by no means difficult to vary a psycho- 



physical method, and so to set up a claim 

 of originality ; but it requires patience and 

 some self-sacrifice to work through a psy- 

 chophysical method to the bitter end. 

 What we now want is less ingenuity and 

 more work— accurate, continuous work all 

 along the line. We have methods and we 

 have formula;. Let us give them a thor- 

 ough test. The results will be of extreme 

 value for psychophysics, and no one need 

 fear that they will be barren for psychol- 

 ogy. On the contrary, no small part of our 

 analytical knowledge of the higher proc- 

 esses, as they are called — processes of judg- 

 ment, of comparison, of abstraction— de- 

 rives straight from the method-work of 

 psychophysics. It would, in my opinion, 

 be time and energy well spent, if every 

 existing laboratory were to undertake what 

 one might term the routine work of testing 

 out, without modification, one or other of 

 the classical methods. 



I. am aware that psychophysics trenches 

 upon large problems. I ought, indeed, to 

 be keenly alive to these problems, seeing 

 that for the past three years they have oc- 

 cupied me, with but little intermission. 

 There is the great problem of mental meas- 

 urement itself; there are the minor prob- 

 lems of the validity of the difference 

 limen, the equality of just noticeable differ- 

 ences, the range of Weber's Law, the cor- 

 relation of functional constants, and what 

 not. If I were speaking of the history of 

 experimental psychology, and not of its 

 present status, I might hope to show you 

 that more has been done towards a solution 

 of these problems than the current state- 

 ments in text-books and magazines would 

 lead one to suppose. But, with these prob- 

 lems in mind, I insist that the immediate 

 demand in psychophysics is for careful, 

 straightforward work by the approved 

 methods. We shall gain more from such 

 work than from anything else. 



(2) Affection.— y^hen we turn to the af- 



