December 9, 1904.] 



SCIENCE. 



takmg-down of an indnctorram ; the stu- 

 dent made the manipulations continuously, 

 under time control, and gave his intro- 

 spective record at the end of each experi- 

 ment. We worked at the problem for a 

 year, only to learn that we had been too 

 ambitious; we had, as even with experi- 

 ence one is apt to do, underestimated the 

 complexity of consciousness. At the same 

 time, we decided that the problem was 

 soluble ; we gathered iu a good store of in- 

 trospective results, even if they were too 

 individual, and too discrete, to be em- 

 ployed for, generalization; with more time 

 and more observers, or with a simpler set 

 of voluntary movements for study, we 

 should have accomplished something for 

 psychology. I regard such studies as those 

 recently made on the control of the retra- 

 hens of the ear, or on the control of the 

 winking reflex, as extremely promising in 

 this field. At any rate, whether we work 

 from the classical reaction experiment, or 

 whether we take voluntary movement un- 

 der more natural conditions, the problem 

 is quite definite : we must submit action to 

 an introspective analysis as detailed and as 

 searching as that to which we have sub- 

 jected perception. 



I have put off (7) imaginaiion, because 

 I am a little afraid of the term. It is a 

 word which, like perception, I should be 

 glad to see discarded from the vocabulary 

 of experimental psychology. I think that 

 we employ it more vaguely even than we 

 employ perception ; and I think that the 

 future will substitute for it a number of 

 descriptive terms. If we begin with the 

 elementary process, the image itself, we 

 must plead ignorance on two fundamental 

 points: whether image quality is coexten- 

 sive with sensation quality, and whether 

 image difference is adequate to sense dis- 

 crimination. If we go to the other ex- 

 treme, and regard imagination as the gen- 

 eral name for a group of typical forma- 



tions—as a concept coordinate with mem- 

 ory—we must surely say that experimental 

 psychology is, as yet, hardly over the 

 threshold of the subject. We know, per- 

 haps, hoAV to set to work: some investiga- 

 tions have been made, and some hints 

 toward method have been given ; but, in 

 the large, this chapter of experimental 

 psychology remains to be written. 



(8) Of the more complex affective for- 

 mations we can say but little until we have 

 a better psychology of feeling. No doubt, 

 there are certain problems in the psychol- 

 ogy of sentiment, and more especially in 

 that of the esthetic sentiments, that can, 

 within limits, be handled without regard 

 to the ultimate categories of feeling. I 

 ■ should, however, consider these limits as 

 very strictly drawn. (9) For the higher 

 intellectital processes we have, I think, 

 three sources of knowledge: direct experi- 

 ment—that, as you know, has been well 

 begun, — the indirect results of experiment 

 upon sensation, and Volkerpsychologie. I 

 am inclined to lay great stress upon the 

 second of these sources. Experimental 

 psychology has often been reproached, on 

 the one hand, because it devotes most of its 

 time to sensation, and on the other because 

 the results of its dealings with the higher 

 processes are jejune and meager. To the 

 former charge I plead guilty, in so far as 

 we have avoided the affective problems, 

 though this neglect is not at all what the 

 framers of the accusation have in mind. 

 And even so, I might offer in extenuation 

 the experimental work upon attention. But 

 this apart, I think that experimental psy- 

 chology is justified in its choice of topics. 

 The only way to catch the higher intel- 

 lectual processes in course of formation is 

 to work from the periphery, by way of the. 

 sense organs. It is when we are working 

 with tones, or with lifted weights, that the 

 amazing diversity and complexity of judg- 

 ment becomes apparent. If, on the con- 



