464 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XI. No. 273. 



to anything but these sensations and their laws. 

 He must at least make believe that the act of 

 will, for instance, is composed merely of sensa- 

 tions chiefly from the muscles, because only 

 thereby is ' explanation ' possible. In psychol- 

 ogy, consequently, the truth ia inevitably con- 

 cealed, and some complex of sensations is sub- 

 stituted for the real mental process which we 

 are to explain. 



Few psychologists, I feel sure, would admit 

 that this is a correct account of the psycholog- 

 ical method. It sounds almost like a veiled 

 apologia for some of the theories of both Profes- 

 sor Miinsterberg and Professor James. They 

 have each in their own way attempted to con- 

 vince the world that certain ' complexes of sen- 

 sations ' were the whole truth in an act of will 

 or an emotion ; and the world has in the main 

 steadily refused to be convinced. But now we 

 are, as it were, called into the private office, 

 and are told : "Of course, gentlemen, the com- 

 plexes of sensations really are not the will or 

 the emotion, but that is what we have to say 

 they are if we are to be faithful to psychology." 



But if in actually experiencing volition or 

 emotion we clearly see that it is not a mere group 

 of sensations, why should we be called upon 

 gravely to declare in our psychologies the oppo- 

 site? There is nothing in the rules of psychol- 

 ogy to prevent our saying all the while that we 

 are talking about the sensations characteristic of 

 will or of emotion or of judgment — a mere part 

 of the full process in consciousness. And if we 

 can see, for instance, that a judgment has 

 features additional to the mere sensations of 

 muscular flexion or extension, I see no reason 

 why, as psychologists, we should say, resign- 

 edly, that these other features are indescribable 

 and beyond the pale of science. Quite apart 

 from the question of values or of ideals, the 

 experience itself reveals peculiarities of form 

 that are quite definite and intelligible and com- 

 municable — has subject and predicate and the 

 affirmative or negative connection, all of which 

 are absent when the same sensations appear in 

 a merely associative or temporal connection. 

 Professor Miinsterberg gives no sufficient reason 

 why psychologists should hold that sensations 

 are the only things in a mental process that are 

 definite and describable and capable of helping 



to explain the process. As well might the 

 physicist say that in his realm the bare atoms 

 are all that he can take account of; when, in 

 fact, time and distance are most necessary for 

 any explanation that really explains. In other 

 words, physical science has to take account 

 both of the ' elements ' and of their relation- 

 ship or 'form.' And psychologists must do the 

 same, noting not only such relations as are 

 common to psychology and the physical sci- 

 ences (time, for instance), but searching dili- 

 gently whether there may not be some that are 

 peculiar to our private mental life. 



The general trend of the book, as can be 

 readily seen, is to propose a more moderate 

 estimate of psychology in general and of the 

 laboratory work particularly. The later meth- 

 ods all come in for a drubbing : there is no 

 quantitative work possible by psychological ex- 

 periments ; the brain physiologists can only 

 borrow from psychology but give nothing in 

 return ; and child-study, with honorable excep- 

 tions, is something of a humbug. So that the 

 general tone is a trifle disheartening to any of 

 us who have faith in psychology and wish it 

 well. As a counter-blast to those writings 

 that magnify the office of psychology it may 

 serve a good purpose. And since it is largely 

 addressed to teachers, its chief benefit will un- 

 doubtedly be to remind them that a correct 

 appreciation of the child and of the aims and 

 ideals which are to be aroused in him is quite 

 as important as a knowledge of the mechanism 

 of the child's mind. 



Geokgb M. Stratton. 



University of California. 



The Races of Man. An Outline of Anthropol- 

 ogy and Ethnography. By J. Deniker, Sc. D. 

 (Paris)-London. 1900. Walter Scott (Amer- 

 ican publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons). 611 

 pp., 176 illus., 2 maps. 



The author of this handy text-book, forming 

 Volume 37 in the Contemporary Science Series, 

 is librarian of the Mus6e d'Histoire Naturelle 

 in Paris. Moreover, he is a ripe specialist in 

 human biology. Having, then, his own past 

 experience as a guide, and being in touch with 

 all the literature upon his theme, one is not 

 surprised to find him interesting and instructive 



