610 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XI. No. 277. 



"to save it from the inherent weakness of a 

 possible mechanical explanation. A further 

 instance of the failure of mechanical con- 

 ■ceptions to account for observed phenomena 

 is cited in the attempt of Helmholtz, 

 Clausius, Kelvin, not to mention less well 

 known workers, to modify Maj'cr's concep- 

 tion of the equivalency of various forms of 

 energy, by the notion that all forms of en- 

 ergy are fundamentally the same — mechan- 

 ical energy. Whereas it has remained 

 impossible to conceive of a working mech- 

 anism for certain forms of energy, this 

 idea is no longer urged as an appendage to 

 the original conception, though it is pointed 

 out its freedom from any arbitrary hy- 

 pothesis should have been a sufficient 

 reason. In another place be calls atten- 

 tion to the arbitrary hypothesis in the 

 kinetic theory of gases ; of artificially neu- 

 tralizing the properties of directions by as- 

 suming that collisions are taking place 

 equally in all directions ; and the conse- 

 quent failure, when attempts are made to 

 extend the theory to electrical energy for 

 example. This has been clearly pointed 

 out by Mach also. 



What we know of the outside world is 

 through our senses, inherently energy man- 

 ifestations. Of what gave rise to the sen- 

 sations we know naught but these energy 

 phenomena, or differences of energJ^ We 

 are not accustomed to regard them objec- 

 tively however, and we conceive for our- 

 selves a mental picture, a mechanical one, 

 matter, which it is true we cannot attempt 

 to disassociate from energy, as giving rise 

 to the energy manifestations which we can 

 and do know. And to this hypothetical 

 matter are ascribed properties, the most 

 striking being its permanency or ' indestruc- 

 tibility.' Says Mach, "all our effort to 

 mirror the world in thought would be futile 

 if we found nothing permanent in the varied 

 changes of things. It is this that impels 

 us to form the notion of substance." 



The hypothetical existence of matter is 

 then merely a mental effort to give a me- 

 chanical explanation to observed energy 

 phenomena ; not as will be presently indi- 

 cated that it is necessary we should have a 

 mechanical explanation of phenomena, but 

 that it has become a habit of mind with us. 

 And with the notion of matter and of mat- 

 ter as made up of discreet molecules or 

 atoms, we bring in many other arbitrary 

 hypotheses. In accounting for special phe- 

 nomena we have modified our original hy- 

 potheses with special attributes to meet each 

 specific case : the present notions regarding 

 the asymmetric carbon atoms ; space iso- 

 mers and polymers in general ; varying 

 valency ; complex or ' physical ' molecules 

 determining the symmetry of crystals, etc. 

 It is not contended by any one that these 

 hypotheses have not been useful. Indeed, 

 in the field of organic chemistry it is not 

 easy to see how it could have reached its 

 present highly developed stage without 

 them. But it is contended that with a re- 

 alization of the exact position of the hy- 

 pothesis with relation to the phenomena for 

 which it seeks to account, should come a 

 realization of the retarding influence it un- 

 doubtedly has had, and may have on the 

 development of science. It has been well 

 said, that " it would not become physical 

 science to see in its self-created, changeable, 

 economical tools, molecules and atoms, re- 

 alities behind phenomena. Forgetful of the 

 lately acquired sapience of her older sister, 

 philosophy, in substituting a mechanical 

 mythology for the old animistic or meta- 

 physical scheme, and thus creating no end 

 of supposititious problems. The atom must 

 remain a tool for representing phenomena 

 like the functions of mathematics." 



But if it be philosophically weak to use 

 this mechanical device in accounting for ob- 

 served phenomena, because unnecessary, be- 

 cause it necessitates a constant modification 

 by subsidiary hypotheses and finally shows 



