May 4, 1900.] 



SCIENCE. 



709 



— whatever ' doing ' may mean in psycliological 

 terms. 



Imitation receives scanty notice. Emotion 

 is more adequately treated ; still, one is sur- 

 prised to find the genesis of emotive states so 

 little dwelt upon. The opportunity for giving 

 a valuable account of the history of emotion 

 has not been seized. The last part of Book III. 

 is devoted to special percepts and includes Per- 

 ception of External Reality, of Space, and of 

 Time. 



The ordinary distinction is observed between 

 perception and idea ; perception is based on sen- 

 sation, as we have seen ; it is the meaning which 

 sensation acquires, while idea is similarly related 

 to image. "The image is no more identical 

 with the idea than sensation is identical with 

 perception. The image is only one constituent 

 of the idea ; the other and more important con- 

 stituent is the meaning which the image con- 

 veys." Our old difllculty arises here. Image 

 is surely itself a 'meaning term.' Even as 

 Stout has defined it, it differs from perception 

 in lacking the external stimulus ; it does not 

 depart from perception in wanting meaning, 

 but, as he puts it, in being worked out ' in the 

 head.' It is, then, a representation, a 'men- 

 tal picture.' As he himself illustrates it : "If 

 I think about the Duke of Wellington, the 

 image present to my consciousness may be 

 only the shadowy outline of an aquiline nose." 

 Think of the outline of an aquiline nose being 

 conscious' stuff,' devoid of meaning ! It is two 

 degrees removed ; it is not only not a bit of con- 

 sciousness, it is not an image ; although one may 

 have an image of it. The same confusion ap- 

 pears when the author turns to examine the char- 

 acteristics of the ' mental image, ' and asks : "la 

 what respect does an object as merely imaged 

 differ from the same object as actually per- 

 ceived?" Not a psychological question at all, 

 as it is put. To make the matter quite explicit 

 we read a little farther on: "In what follows 

 the object as perceived is simply called the ' per- 

 cept' and the object as imaged, the ' image.' " 

 Having gone so far, we are not surprised to 

 come upon a serious discussion of Hume's 

 ' force and liveliness ' as ' distinctive of sensa- 

 tions.' Now it is one thing to compare sensa- 

 tions, peripherally and centrally aroused, with 



each other, and quite another to compare the 

 ' percept ' with the 'image.' Clearly, Hume's 

 task was the latter. It must be said that the 

 author enters into a more serious and pains- 

 taking investigation of idea and image than is 

 commonly to be found in general treatises. His 

 introspection is full and fresh, but not always 

 free from ambiguity. In the following instances 

 he does not seem to be quite sure-footed : 

 "What the stimulus does for us in percep- 

 tion, we have to do for ourselves in ideation." 

 "Images are maintained before consciousness 

 purely by an effort of attention." " Ideas fol- 

 low each other in accordance with purely psy- 

 chological conditions." "In merely imaging 

 ' the attention feels as if drawn backward to- 

 wards the brain.' " 



Under the heading ' Trains of Ideas ' comes 

 the discussion of Association and of Ideal Con- 

 struction. The substance of the chapter is that 

 associations are due to 'continuity of interest,' 

 and the associated material is modified to suit 

 the associating consciousness. There is little 

 to note in the memory chapter. Memory is re- 

 production ; some suggestions are offered to- 

 wards raising its efficiency. In the treatment 

 of comparison, conception and language we get 

 back to the genetic problem, and, at the same 

 time, come upon a delightfully clear and care- 

 fully thought out exposition of one of the cruces 

 of psychology : the passage from the idea to 

 the cognitive processes which stand upon the 

 next higher level. After the stage of concep- 

 tual thinking is reached by the aid of lan- 

 guage, whose function it is to break up the con- 

 crete items of sense perception and re-combine 

 them into new wholes, the author proceeds to 

 elaborate the process by which the external 

 world and the self are produced as ideal con- 

 structions. The first motives to such construc- 

 tion are found to be practical : the bringing 

 coherence and order into experience and the 

 adjustment of the individual to his fellows in 

 the community. 



With Royce and Baldwin, Dr. Stout gives 

 the social factor peculiar importance in this 

 process. Involved with these constructions is 

 the matter of belief and the distinction between 

 belief and imagination. With Bain, the author 

 finds the key to belief to lie in its relation to 



