176 KANSAS CITY REVIEW OF SCIENCE. 



(inexplicable because it lies above knowledge), by which the object producing 

 an idea is recognized in its true relation to the nature of things. Therefore the 

 act of consciousness marks the Hmit beyond which we may not proceed in in- 

 quiring after the causes of our knowledge The conditions necessary to the 

 proper operation of this act of consciousness will therefore be the conditions 

 necessary to the possibility of knowledge. 



Now it is evident that no knowledge would be possible without the condi- 

 tions of Fact or Truth, Mind, Idea and Consciousness : but these are not all the 

 conditions necessary. There can be no knowledge without conviction, for no 

 man can know a truth and not believe it, and if he fail to believe truth it is be- 

 <;ause he does not know it. 



Still there may be conviction without knowledge — for instance, for a long 

 time men believed that the earth stood still and that the stars revolved around it, 

 and their conviction was as firmly estabhshed as if such kad actually been the 

 case. They certainly did not know that the earth moved, nor did they know that 

 it stood still, for it did not. Therefore they knew nothing whatever about it. 

 They were mistaken. Hence, we may say that conviction, without knowledge is 

 ■error. 



Again, the knowledge of no man is superior to his conviction nor is there 

 any difference between the processes by which knowledge is gained and convic- 

 tion established, because no man will investigate what seems to be a truth, fur- 

 ther than to establish his conviction concerning it. If he stops short of convic- 

 tion he will confess that he has gained no knowledge, but if he reaches it, it will 

 be impossible to get him to proceed with his investigation until his conviction is 

 shaken. And, furthermore, every man's conviction, though wrong, is the same 

 to him as knowledge until he has found his error. From which it must follow 

 that conviction results from the same act of the mind as that producing knowl- 

 edge, with the difference, however, that the object producing an idea is recog- 

 nized in a particular relation to the nature of things, which relation may be true 

 or false. It is evident then that knowledge is impossible without true conviction. 



Again, should the contemplation of different objects produce the same idea, 

 we should not be able to distinguish one object from another, and should an ob- 

 ject at one time produce an idea different from that produced at another, we 

 should not be able to recognize it. So that in order for knowledge to be possible 

 it is necessary that each object should always produce in the mind a particular 

 idea and no other, and that this idea should be different from that produced by 

 any other object whatever. This is the well known condition of Identity and 

 Diversity of Idea, which involves both mind and object, and renders necessary 

 an adaptation of the one to the other. 



It will be seen that this condition does not require that the idea should rep- 

 resent the object just as it is — that is, the condition of Identity and Diversity 

 will be fulfilled if the idea be either a symbol, or an image of the object, and 

 hence arise those numerous disputes about the doctrine of perception into which 

 jphilosophers enter by contradicting each other — seldom carry far without contra- 



