THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 179- 



axioms of their attribute of necessity ^which will in no way invalidate our reason- 

 ing) and place them in the category of natural laws where, in fact, they would 

 then belong, knowledge of law and knowledge of necessity would become identi- 

 cal and the conditions of the one would become the conditions of the other. 

 This shows that the knowledge of law and the knowledge of necessity may be 

 obtained under the same conditions, and that since no one ever held the ideas 

 produced by facts to be innate, those produced by axioms should not be so con- 

 sidered. 



The only objection to this conclusion would be that in order to reach it it 

 was necessary to reduce axioms to the category of natural laws, where they do 

 not belong and that if we restore their attributes of necessity we would get a 

 knowledge different from the knowledge of law. This is true, but by what is the 

 difference determined? The answer is by a difference of conviction alone. 



Giving back to axioms their attributes of necessity and we find the only ef- 

 fect is to strengthen our conviction of their truth so as not to be shaken by 

 anything of which we can conceive. It only remains to account for the manner 

 in which the mind becomes possessed of this distinctive conviction. We have 

 shown that a proposition to be knowable must have one of its extremes conceiva 

 ble, the other not. 



Now the question " Is a proposition knowable ? " is as important as the question 

 " Is it true? " for our criterion of truth cannot be higher than our criterion of the 

 limits within which truth may be investigated. 



Whence the following enunciation : When the mind can conceive of the 

 possibility of a proposition which is independent of existence and cannot con- 

 ceive of its impossibihty, the proposition is knowable and possible and true. This 

 then is the mind's criterion of truth. But since we may imagine ourselves to con- 

 ceive when we do not and fail to conceive when we can, the following is also 

 true : When the mind has apparently conceived of the possibility of such a propo- 

 sition and apparently cannot conceive of its impossibility, the proposition may be 

 knowable or unknowable possible or impossible, true or false Knowable, possible 

 and true if the conception is real, unknowable or impossible and false if the con- 

 ception is imaginary. From which it would seem that the criterion enunciated is 

 of little value. 



But granting it to be fallible, it is still sufficient to establish in the mind that 

 peculiar conviction which accompanies the knowledge of necessity and by which 

 alone such knowledge is distinguished. Because necessary propositions are such' 

 that their possibility determines their truth. So that whosoever conceives the one 

 must conceive the other, and no man can conceive such a proposition to be- 

 true and not believe it — and moreover he cannot then conceive the proposition 

 to be false. It is thus therefore that the mind gets its distinctive conviction of 

 necessary truth. It is by this conviction that knowledge of necessity is recog- 

 nized as such, so that without it all our knowledge would be as of one kind. 



In support of what has been said can be cited the credulity of the untrained' 

 mind which often accepts as truth the uttermost absurdity. The caution of the: 



VI— 12 



