SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INSTRUCTION. 103 
It is autumn, and the fruitful farm groans under its splendid burden; but last 
night a destructive fire swept away every tool and instrument, save one, with 
which to gather the crops. Suppose the farm is sold to a foreigner who is unac- 
quainted with our farm implements. There are the fruits to be gathered and 
shipped, the wheat to be stored, the corn to be husked, the field to be plowed, 
&c., and there is but one instrument with which to do the work. His first 
inquiry evidently is, ‘‘ What kind of work will this instrument perform ?” and not 
‘©Which crop shall I gather first with this instrument?” Now, mind is the sole 
instrument with which the educator deals, and, evidently, his first question must 
be, ‘‘What kind of work will this young mind perform?” and not the question, 
‘© Which branch of study must first be mastered?” The profounder educational 
questions, then, underlying all others, are: What are the principles of mental 
action? What are the elemental acts in the process called ‘‘knowing”? ‘These 
questions carry with them not the tacit but the living assumption that mind, in its 
several departments of intellect, sensibilities and will, is an indication, an express- 
ion of law; and it matters not to the present view whether that law be surmised 
or wholly unknown. This point settled, then, let us proceed to consider the 
questions: How do we acquire? What mystery lies concealed in the dawning of 
intelligence? How are mental faculties aroused to discharge their several func- 
tions, and in what order of succession? ‘To answer these questions, we need to 
consult only our own experiences as simulated in the daily activities of a child. 
A simple illustration: A book falls to the floor; the floor trembles; the air 
quivers; the drums of the tympanum vibrate, and the internal ear transmits the 
vibrations to the nerve which carries them to the brain; terminating this series is 
consciousness of sound. An idea of sound is subsequent to these physical move- 
ments, which it could never precede. Without the former, the latter could have 
no existence. Likewise, the child can never have the thought of heat until its 
nervous organism has been affected by heat. In these acts of knowing, it would 
be difficult to determine whether the sevtiens is more important than the sensum, 
put it is quite unimportant, since neither is dispensable. An object must be per- 
ceived before it can be conceived. It must become to us an object of sense 
before it can become an object of thought. It must first be presented before it 
can be represented. Ideas of roughness, area, elasticity, form, attraction, law, 
are based upon, are awakened by or arise from perceptions, and never precede 
them. And, generally, Frcebel’s system is the only practical philosophy of edu- 
cation extant. 
The class in Physics recites—no apparatus to illustrate the subject. The 
‘pupil answers: ‘<A body is in stable equilibrium when it will return to its for- 
mer position after it has been slightly disturbed.” Well recited, but what does 
that mean? Illustrate. Here is a cone—explain your definition. Several 
attempts, failing to clear up the definition, succeed in showing a total want of 
comprehension of stable and unstable equilibrium. Success is reached only after 
many questions and failures. Here it is clearly shown that a definition is the 
