57 



(3) The Saltonst all-Kennedy fund has been administered as a source of 

 supplemental funding to which the Comptroller QeneraVs rule is not applicable. 



The validity of the conclusions to be drawn from this legislative history is 

 bolstered by administrative practice in applying Saltonstall-Kennedy funds to 

 fisheries research. 



Although we have not had an opportunity to review copies of recent reports 

 on the administration of Saltonstall-Kennedy funds, the enclosed copy of 

 excerpts from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, "Research 

 and Activities Under the Saltonstall-Kennedy Act, Fiscal Year 1956" reveals 

 that Saltonstall-Kennedy funds were, consistent with Congressional intent, 

 applied to program activities for which other funds were also specifically 

 appropriated as part of the regular Fish and Wildlife Service Appropriation. 



As Mr. Schoning notes in his letter, Saltonstall-Kennedy funds were estab- 

 lished for broad general purposes, and it is our understanding that these funds 

 have uniformly been applied to supplement fisheries research and development 

 programs for which specific appropriations were made, and that this practice 

 by the Fish and Wildlife Service and then by the National Marine Fisheries 

 Service brought no objection from the Congress or from the Comptroller General. 

 To restrict application of Saltonstall-Kennedy funds to only those activities for 

 which specific appropriations have not been made, in the absence of any indica- 

 tion from GAO that they are so restricted, would be inconsistent with past 

 practice and would unduly narrow their utility for the general purposes for 

 which they were created. 



(4) The cited opinions illustrating the Comptroller General's rule are clearly 

 distinguishable from the present case. 



As noted above, the Saltonstall-Kennedy fund was intended as a source of 

 funding to supplement activities for which specific appropriations were and 

 would be made. A presumption concerning Congressional intent in establishing 

 the fund is therefore unnecessary since it is expressed in the legislative history. 

 The presumption that Saltonstall-Kennedy funds should not be available when 

 specific appropriations are made is rebutted by that legislative history. 



An examination of the factual situations upon which the cited opinions were 

 based indicates that, contrary to the present case, the rule was invoked precisely 

 because there was no legislative history to support the use of both general and 

 specific appropriations for the same purpose. 



In B-13468 (20 Comp. Gen. 272), the Secretary of the Navy proposed to use 

 general funds, appropriated pursuant to an act approved on July 19, 1940, to add 

 a penthouse to a new wing of the Navy Department Building. A specific 

 appropriation for the wing had been approved only three months after the 

 first act, on October 9, 1940. While the general authorization was worded so 

 as to arguably include the proposed expenditure, it was by no means clear that 

 Congress had intended such a result. An intention to exclude the use of general 

 funds was presumed from the nearly contemporaneous, specific provision for 

 the wing in another act. 



Similarly, in B-11810 (20 Comp. Gen. 102), cited in B-13468, the Secretary 

 of the Navy was denied approval to use funds, appropriated to provide 

 "necessary buildings, facilities, utilities, and appurtenances thereto * * * " asso- 

 ciated with national defense construction, for the purpose of housing workers 

 engaged in shipbuilding and airplane production programs. The very same act 

 contained a specific appropriation for "making necessary housing available for 

 persons engaged in national-defense activities." P.L. 76-671, 54 Stat. 6S1 (1940). 

 In light of that fact, the Comptroller General concluded: "[h]aving thus 

 specifically legislated on the subject, it is not to be inferred that the Congress 

 intended, by the same act and without express mention, to authorize the 

 general use'[proposed by the Secretary]." (20 Comp. Gen. at 103, 104). 



The leading case cited in the General Counsel's Manual is B-9460 (19 Comp. 

 Gen. 892). There, the Secretary of the Interior sought agreement that use of 

 general appropriation funds to supplement an expenditure of $45,000, specifically 

 appropriated for the construction of a warehouse in Alaska, was acceptable. 

 The Comptroller General disagreed and inferred that Congress must have 

 intended, by its specific consideration and approval of funding for the ware- 

 house, to exclude the use of other funds. 



In B-11SS03, the general appropriation expressly provided for "necessary 

 operating expenses of the Veterans Administration, not othertcise provided for". 



