58 



The < omptroller General ruled thai funds from this source were do! available 

 for expenses for which a specific appropriation had been made and "otherwise 

 provided." As noted above, the legislative history of the Saltonstall-Kennedy 

 fund is clear thai the Congressional Intenl with respect to use of those funds 

 was exactly opposite they were Intended for use as supplements] funds. 



The remaining cases cited in the Manual involved similar factual patterns. 

 In B 180109 i." 1 '. Comp. Gen. 526), the Secretary of Commerce was denied 

 permission to use general appropriation funds in addition to an $18,000,000 

 supplemental appropriation for an atomic powered merchant ship. The Comp- 

 troller General, Impressed by the fact thai both appropriations were before the 

 Congress at the same time, determined that Congress could not have intended 

 such a use. otherwise, there would have been no reason for Congress to specify 

 any particular sum for the vessel; it simply could have added $ 1 x.000,000 to 

 the general appropriation. The Secretary of Commerce unsuccessfully con- 

 tended that this, iii fact, was the proper interpretation of the supplemental 

 appropriation. In B-138S98 (38 Gomp, Gen. 758), the Administrator of the 

 General Services Administration was not allowed to accept payment from the 

 Federal Aviation Agency for renovation of an office building. The decision was 

 based primarily on consideration of 11 l.S.C. §12, discussed below. The 

 Comptroller General's opinion was bolstered by the fact that, since GSA had 

 a specific appropriation for such renovations. Congress could not have intended 

 to permit the use of other funds for such purposes. 



Finally, it should be noted thai most of the cases cited in the Manual 

 involved a second statutory prohibition, in addition to that contained in 31 

 D.S.C. §628. Section 12 of Title 41, United Slates Code (at that time, Section 

 37.T>. Revised Statutes) provides: 



"No contract shall be entered into for the erection, repair, or furnishing of 

 any public building, or for any public improvement which shall bind the 

 Covernment to pay a larger sum of money than the amount in the Treasury 

 appropriated for the specific purpose." 



Thus, in these opinions the Comptroller General was constrained by Section 12 

 to limit the costs of the buildings involved to a specifically appropriated amount. 

 In B-13468 (20 Comp. Gen. 272), Congress was presumed to have decided upon 

 a wing of the Navy Department Building without a penthouse; in B-11810 

 (20 Comp. Gen. 102), a specific amount was provided for government housing, 

 and Section 12 would have prohibited any additional expenditures : and in 

 B-9460 (19 Comp. Got. S92), Congress had approved only a $45,000 warehouse. 

 As noted above, the primary consideration upon which the decision in 

 B-138598 (38 Comp. Gen. 758) rested was 41 U.S.C. §12: because the FAA had 

 no specific appropriation for "public improvements," none of its funds were 

 available for building renovations. Clearly, no such constraint is applicable to 

 the use of Saltonstall-Kennedy funds for tuna-porpoise research. 



U.S. Department of Commerce, 

 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 



National Marine Fisheries Service, 



Washington, B.C., November 24, 1575. 

 Mr. John R. Twiss, 



Executive Director, Marine Mammal Commission, 1625 Eye Street XW., 

 Washington, D.C. 

 Dear John : Your letter of November 18, 1975, stated that "The Commission 

 recommends that the National Marine Fisheries Service apply 'Saltonstall- 

 Kennedy' funds (15 USC 713C-3(a)) to a solution of the tuna/porpoise 

 problem." As was indicated at a meeting on this subject in Congressman 

 I^eggett's office, on November 19, 1975, we believe that the use of Saltonstall- 

 Kennedy funds, which has broad general purposes, for Marine Mammal 

 Protection Act purposes, may be a violation of the GAO rulings regarding the 

 use of appropriations. Essentially, the Comptroller General has stated that "the 

 rule is well established that the existence of a specific appropriation for an 

 object precludes the use of a more general appropriation which would otherwise 

 be available." An excerpt from the General Accounting Office's, Office of General 

 Counsel manual, is enclosed for your information. 



