196 



policing for the common good by means <>f the "skippers' panel" has already 

 dealt in the last few weeks with problems of inept or untrained Skippers and 

 Ill-equipped boats. Ridding the fleet of these Jonahs or solving their problems 

 will significantly diminish mortality. 



In short, the evidence clearly suggests that the industry can stay within its 



59,000 quota; 



:;. The economic effects of the regulations. 



The Industry alleges that the decision on 1977 regulations has required the 

 fleet to return to port since it cannot operate under such terms profitably. 

 However, much of the fleet would have been returning to port within the next 

 few weeks anyway, albeit perhaps not so early, to gain eligibility for the "one 

 tree Hip" into the OYRA as described above. 



Speaking more generally, the American tuna fleet has long suffered serious 

 economic problems completely unrelated to the porpoise question. The fleet is 

 overcapitalized, with newer vessels heavily mortgaged and suffering inflated 

 operating expenses, such as for fuel, not foreseen when they were constructed. 

 Despite the fact that 1975 and 1976 were, measured by tons of tuna landed, 

 the most sucessful fishing years in history for the U. S. fleet, the average boat 

 lost money according to government figures, covering variable but not fixed 

 costs; The U. S. fleet faces increased foreign competition (ironically much of 

 it U. S. built, crewed, and subsidized) for a diminishing resource. The price of 

 tuna has not substantially changed for 15 years, evidence of market saturation 

 and/or buyer resistance and/or oversupply. Employment in canneries has been 

 diminishing measured by hours worked ever since 1973, when no porpoise 

 quotas were in effect. Automation and non-unionized Puerto Rican labor have 

 affected mainland U.S. canneries far more than any porpoise regulations. 



In short, the U. S. tuna industry is troubled financially, and is ripe for an 

 economic shake-out completely unrelated to the porpoise question. There is no 

 reason to make the porpoise the scapegoat for investor miscalculations in this 

 industry. 



4. Taking of porpoise before April. 



The industry complains that whatever the likely ultimate effect of the 

 XMFS Director's regulations, the fleet cannot gain any benefits from them for 

 at least the 30 days prescribed by law before they go into effect. While this 

 may be true, it overlooks the fact that most of the fleet would have spent 

 part of this period in port anyway waiting to qualify for the "free trip." It 

 also overlooks the fact that the question of interim relief is currently pend- 

 ing in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where the 

 industry is being joined by NMFS and most environmental groups in its 

 request that some porpoise fishing be permitted, to count toward the annual 

 quota, prior to the 1977 regulations and permits taking effect. While the 

 interim relief requested still would not permit taking of spinner porpoise, it 

 would permit setting on other species, thereby improving the industry's capa- 

 bility for the next 4-5 weeks. Offshore Spotted Porpoise, the species that 

 •'carries" the tuna and is primarily set upon, would be available. 



There is no way of knowing when and what the Court of Appeals will rule, 

 hut it is entirely conceivable it will favor interim relief now that the admin- 

 istrative decision is final, and the jurisdictional squabble between it and the 

 1 T . S. District Court for the Southern District of California — San Diego is^ 

 settled. 



In summary, neither environmentalists nor the industry are entirely happy 

 with the NMFS decision, either its substance or timing. The difference is that 

 we are prepared to accept the results in a spirit of compromise, whereas the 

 industry's reaction continues to be one of truculent obduracy. The Marine 

 Mammil Protection Act was passed in 1972. Since that time the U. S. fleet 

 has killed nearly 800.000 porpoise. Since 1974 when the industry became sub- 

 ject to the Act and the fleet's two-year grace period expired, there has been 

 little evidence of industry compliance with the Act's "immediate goal that the- 

 incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in 

 the course of commercial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels 

 approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate." NMFS annual mor- 

 tality figures speak for themselves: 1974—99,000; 1975—135,000; 1976—104,000 

 in ten months, an annual rate of 130,000. Killing has plateaued at annual 

 levels of over 100,000. 



