200 



the inevitable unintentional take, result in a total kill far higher 

 than what the special can absorb and still grow in population size 

 with a virtual certainty, the NMKS and act's— goal. 



•_'. The 59,000 total porpoise ijuota 



The industry alleges the total quota is below the level required for 

 the fleel to operate profitably. However, assuming no porpoise taking 

 until April, the quota is set at an annual rate of 90,000, the high end 

 n\' what the industry's own witnesses testified at the hearings they 

 required. 



Further, hist year 20 boats equipped with the fine mesh net re- 

 quired for all boats this year had such low kill rates that if extra- 

 polated across the licet, less than 10,000 porpoise total would have 

 been killed in 1976. 



Not only will all boats be equipped this year with fine mesh nets, 

 hut use of new techniques — longer backdown periods guided by men 

 in rubber rafts and face plates at the corkline assisting porpoises 

 out of the net — will greatly reduce mortality, as illustrated by the 

 results ot the recent cruise of the Elizabeth C.J. Further, last year 

 only a small fraction of the fleet's skippers and boats were responsi- 

 ble for a disproportionately large percentage of the kill. Industry 

 self-policing for the common good by means of the "skippers' panel v 

 has already dealt in the last few weeks with problems of inept or un- 

 trained skippers and ill equipped boats. Ridding the fleet of these 

 Jonahs or solving their problems will significantly diminish mor- 

 tality. 



In short, the evidence clearly suggests that the industry can stay 

 within its 59,000 quota. 



3. The economic efforts of the regulations 



The industry alleges that the decision on 1977 regulations has re- 

 quired the fleet to return to port since it cannot operate under such 

 terms profitably. However, much of the fleet would have been re- 

 turning to port within the next few weeks anyway, albeit perhaps 

 not so early, to gain eligibility for the "one free trip'' into the CYRA 

 as described above. 



Speaking more generally, the American tuna fleet has long suffered 

 serious economic problems completely unrelated to the porpoise 

 question. The fleet is overcapitalized, with newer vessels heavily mort- 

 gaged and suffering inflated operating expenses, such as for fuel, 

 not foreseen when they were constructed. Despite the fact that V>~~> 

 and 1976 were, measured by tons of tuna landed, the most successful 

 fishing years in history for the U.S. fleet, the average boat lost money 

 according to Government figures, covering variable but not fixed 

 COSN. 



The U.S. fleet faces increased foreign competition — ironically much 

 of it U.S. built, creweed, and subsidized — for a diminishing resource. 

 The price of tuna has not substantially changed for 15 years, evidence 

 of market saturation and/or buyer resistance and/or oversupply. 



Employment in canneries have been diminishing measured by 

 hours worked since 1973, when no porpoise quotas were in effect. 

 Automation and largely nonunionized Puerto Rican labor have af- 

 fected mainland U.S. canneries far more than any porpoise regula- 

 tions. 



