obligations can lielp integrate federal agency activities in support of a regionally 

 supported fish and wildlife program. 



Critics of the Northwest Power Act make a number of points. Some argue that 

 increasing regional participation in fish and wildlife policy and river operations was part 

 of a general fragmentation in decision making authority. While the region had more 

 authority in decisions affecting the river after 1980, so did others. Federal agencies 

 (Bonneville, the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation) retain discretion 

 regarding implementation of the Council's program, so implementation can become 

 confused, frustrating effectiveness and agency accountability. Most state and tribal 

 agencies are not bound by the Council's program. Neither the Council nor anyone else 

 has enough legal authority to unite diverse actors behind a single policy for the river and 

 its fish and wildlife. Those dissatisfied with a federal agency decision could turn to the 

 Council, the Congress or the federal courts. Those dissatisfied with a Council decision 

 could turn to the federal agencies, the governors. Congress or the courts. In many 

 instances, a dissatisfied party could prevent an action simply by not cooperating. No 

 single entity could develop a comprehensive strategy and make it stick. 



It can also be argued that the Northwest Power Act's commitment of Bonneville 

 Power Administration electric power revenues creates a disproportionate reliance on 

 ratepayer financing for species conservation efforts. The concern has two aspects: 

 Bonneville customers are concerned that they may be paying too much. Fish and 

 wildlife interests are concerned that others who contribute to the salmon declines are not 

 paying their fair share toward sahnon recovery. 



Refocused federal control under the Endangered Species Act. In 1990, a 

 conservation organization and an upriver Indian tribe filed new Endangered Species Act 

 petitions to list Snake River salmon. When these populations came under the Act's 

 protection, much of the responsibility for salmon policy shifted back to the federal 

 government. Under the Endangered Species Act, federal agency activities cannot 

 jeopardize the existence of listed populations unless an exemption is granted by a rarely 

 convened cabinet- level committee. In the four years that followed the decision to list 

 Snake River salmon more and more federal decisions -- critical decisions on dam 

 operations, forest management (driven in part by independent efforts to protect another 

 endangered species, the northern spotted owl), grazing, mining and sahnon production -- 

 have been focused on complying with the Endangered Species Act. 



Whatever else may be said about the Endangered Species Act, it can help force 

 coordination of fragmented government activity and focus efforts on the protection of 

 threatened resources. All of the federal agencies - those involved in Columbia River 

 operations and in federal land management -- are faced with the same, preeminent 

 mandate: to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of Snake River salmon. To this 

 extent, the Endangered Species Act listings helped to consolidate fragmented policy. 



Critics of the Endangered Species Act make a number of points and for our 

 purposes three criticisms are especially important: First, the Act does not give much 



