452 



But the fact that the state has jurisdiction over, or even a property interest 

 in, marine mammals in coastal waters, does not preclude the enactment by Con- 

 gress of legislation affecting such mammals in the exercise of powers vested in 

 it by the Constitution. 



In a number of cases, the Supreme Court had held tlhat federal law can be 

 applied to dealings in state property or the operation of state-owned enterprises. 

 For example, in Cause v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) it held that the Emergency 

 Price Control Act applied to the sale by the state of Washington of timber grow- 

 ing on lands granted by Congress to the state "for the siipport of common 

 schools." It rejected both the argument that the Emergency Price Control Act 

 was inconsistent with the terms of the Enabling Act under which the State 

 was admitted to the Union, and the argimient that, as applied to a State, the 

 Price Control Act represented an infringement of States' rights in violation of 

 the Tenth Amendment. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black wrote : 



Nor can we accept the contention that a special exemption could be read 

 into the Act in order to permit States holding land granted for school pur- 

 poses to charge more than the ceiling price set for timber. In reaching t!his 

 conclusion we are not unaware of the diflSculties which confronted the 

 Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of Washington, nor of the im- 

 portance of protecting the public interest in those school lands. Both the 

 Act of Congress, which granted the land to Washington, and the Constitu- 

 tion of the State, had provided for safeguards in connection with the dis- 

 position of school lands. We do not question the wisdom of these precautions. 

 We are mindful also of the fact that this Court has declared that grants of 

 land to the State, like those here involved, transferred exclusive ownership 

 and control over those lands to the State. Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173. 

 No part of all the history concerning these grants, however, indicates a pur- 

 pose on the part of Congress to enter into a permanent agreement with the 

 States under which States would be free to use the lands in a manner which 

 would conflict with valid legislation enacted by Congress in the national 

 interest. 



* * * The State of Washington does have power to own and control the 

 school lands here involved and to sell the lands or the timber growing on 

 them, subject to the limitations set out in the Enabling Act. And our only 

 question is whether the State's power to make the sales must be in subordi- 

 nation to the power of Congress to fix maximum prices for state sales or 

 to control rents charged by a State might result in depriving Congress of 

 ability effectively to prevent the evil of inflation at which the Act was aimed. 

 The result would be that the constitutional grant of the power to make war 

 would be inadequate to accomplisli its full purpose. And this result would 

 impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment 



* * * Where, as here. Congress lias enacted legislation authorized by its 

 granted powers, and where at the same time, a State has a conflicting law 

 which but for the congressional Act would be valid, the Constitution marks 

 the course for courts to follow. Article VI provides that "The Constitution 

 and the Laws of the United States * * * made in Pursuance thereof. * * * 

 shall be the supreme Law of the Land * * *." 



The State Belt Railroad, a common carrier owned and operated by the State 

 of California, was held to be subject to the Raih\-ay Labor Act in California v. 

 Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). Again, the State argued unsuccessfully that Con- 

 gress had no constitutional power to interfere with the "sovereign right" of a 

 State to control its employment relationships on a state owned railroad engaged 

 in interstate commerce. The Court held that in operating the Belt Railroad the 

 State necessarily acted in subordination to the power to regulate interstate 

 commerce which has been granted to the national government. 



Article I, section 8, of the Constitution ve^ts in Congress the i>ower to regulate 

 interstate and foreign commerce and to make all laws necessary and proper for 

 carrying into execution that power. Hence it may regulate intrastate activities 

 to the extent necessary to foster and protect interestate and foreign commerce. 

 Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; United States v. Darii/. 312 

 U.S. 100 (1941). 



Hf Congress flnds that products of any form of marine mammals move in in- 

 terstate commerce and that protection of such mammals is necessary to insure 

 the continued availability of such products its authority to enact necessary and 

 appropriate legislation to furlnish that protection would seem to be valid, as 

 long as the Supreme Court adheres to the reasoning of the eases cited. It is pos- 



