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S. 346 will eliminate inherently unfair pricing advantages 

 for the long-term timber sale contract holders. 



Terminating the Contracts 



United States Supreme Court decisions on whether the United 

 States may terminate contracts to which it is itself a party 

 suggest that S. 346 is constitutional. Because S. 346 is 

 directed at the broad and general public purposes of improving 

 the management of an important public resource and promoting a 

 sustainable and diversified economy dependent upon access to that 

 resource, the Tongass Timber Reform Act will withstand any due 

 process attacks on its constitutionality. Congress always has 

 the authority to terminate contracts between the Federal 

 government and private commercial interests, when that action is 

 in the public interest. 



As the record of this and several previous congressional 

 hearings on the Tongass and its timber industry demonstrate 

 conclusively, long-term timber contracts on the Tongass are 

 obsolete. In their present form, the continued existence of the 

 long-term timber contracts on the Tongass is clearly not in the 

 public interest. 



As demonstrated by the House Interior Committee report 

 (House Report 100-600, 100th Congress, Second Session), there is 

 an overwhelming record supporting the immediate modification of 

 these agreements to remove the impediments to proper forest 

 management and establish fair competition in the southeast Alaska 

 timber market. 



The Forest Service's refusal to implement Section 15(b) of 

 the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA) — requiring the 

 agency to renegotiate these contracts to bring them into 

 compliance with NFMA guidelines and standards — cannot be 

 explained away. There is a great disparity between the 

 opportunities available for long- and short-term purchasers of 

 timber on the Tongass. Continuing such advantages is contrary to 

 public policy. Because of the extensive record supporting the 

 recommended changes in the long-term contracts and common sense 

 process established by H.R. 1516 to achieve those ends, it is our 

 considered opinion that the courts will find H.R. 1516 to be both 

 reasonable and necessary and, therefore, constitutional. 



Whether the enactment of S. 346 is constitutional does not 

 shield the United States from litigation for damages in the 

 United States Claims Court. The United States is immune from 

 suit except in those instances in which it consents to be sued. 

 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1346, 1491, granted consent to 

 sue the United States in the U.S. Claims Court for alleged breach 

 of contract claims. 



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