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SCIENCE. 



[Vol. IX., No. 210 



is evident that there is no middle way : geogra- 

 phy must either be maintained in its full extent or 

 it must be given up altogether. 



As soon as we agree that the purpose of every 

 science is accomplished when the laws which 

 govern its phenomena are discovered, we must 

 admit that the subject of geography is distributed 

 among a great number of sciences ; if, however, 

 we would maintain its independence, we must 

 prove that there exists another object for science 

 besides the deduction of laws from phenomena. 

 And it is our opinion that there is another ob- 

 ject, — the thorough understanding of phenomena. 

 Thus we find that the contest between geographers 

 and their adversaries is identical with the old con- 

 troversy between historical and physical methods. 

 One party claims that the ideal aim of science 

 ought to be the discovery of general law^; the 

 other maintains that it is the investigation of phe- 

 nomena themselves. 



It is easily understood, therefore, why in geog- 

 raphy the contest between these views is particu- 

 larly lively. Here naturalists and historians meet 

 in a common field of work. A great number of 

 modern geographers have been educated as his- 

 torians, and they must try to come to an agree- 

 ment with the naturalists, who, in turn, must 

 learn to accommodate their views to those of the 

 historians. It is evident that an answer to this 

 fundamental question on the value of historical 

 and physical science can only be found by a me- 

 thodical investigation of their relation to each 

 other. 



All agree that the establishment of facts is the 

 foundation and starting-point of science. The 

 physicist compares a series of similar facts, from 

 which he isolates the general phenomenon which 

 is common to all of them. Henceforth the single 

 facts become less important to him, as he lays 

 stress on the general law alone. On the other 

 hand, the facts are the object which is of impor- 

 tance and interest to the historian. An example 

 will explain our meaning more satisfactorily than 

 a theoretical discussion. 



"When Newton studied the motion of the planets, 

 the distribution of those celestial bodies in space 

 and time were the means, not the object, of his 

 researches. His problem was the action of two 

 bodies upon each other, and thus he found the 

 law of gravitation. On the other hand, Kant and 

 Laplace, in studying the solar system, asked the 

 question, Why is every one of the bodies consti- 

 tuting the solar system in the place it occupies? 

 They took the law as granted, and applied it to 

 the phenomena from which it had been deduced, 

 in order to study the history of the solar system. 

 Newton's work was at an end as soon as he had 



found the law of gravitation, which law was the 

 preliminary condition of Kant's work. 



Here is another example : according to Buckle's 

 conception, historical facts must be considered 

 as being caused by physiological and psychological 

 laws. Accordingly, he does not describe men and 

 their actions as arising from their own character 

 and the events influencing their life, but calls our 

 attention to the laws governing the history of 

 mankind. The object of the historians is a dif- 

 ferent one. They are absorbed in the study of the 

 facts, and dwell admiringly on the character of 

 their heroes. They take the most lively interest in 

 the persons and nations they treat of, but are un- 

 willing to consider them as subject to stringent 

 laws. 



We believe that the physical conception is no- 

 where else expressed as clearly as in Comte's sys- 

 tem of sciences. Setting aside astronomy, which 

 has been placed rather arbitrarily between mathe- 

 matics and physics, all his sciences have the one 

 aim, to deduce laws from phenomena. The single 

 phenomenon itself is insignificant : it is only val- 

 uable because it is an emanation of a law, and 

 serves to find new laws or to corroborate old ones. 

 To this system of sciences Humboldt's ' Cosmos ' 

 is opposed in its principle. Cosmography, as we 

 may call this science, considers every phenomenon 

 as worthy of being studied for its own sake. Its 

 mere existence entitles it to a full share of our 

 attention ; and the knowledge of its existence and 

 evolution in space and time fully satisfies the stu- 

 dent, without regard to the laws which it corrob- 

 orates or which may be deduced from it. 



Physicists will acknowledge that the study of 

 the history of many phenomena is a work of sci- 

 entific value. Nobody doubts the importance of 

 Kant's researches on the solar system ; nobody 

 derogates from that of investigations upon the 

 evolution of organisms. However, there is an- 

 other class of phenomena the study of which is 

 not considered of equal value, and among them 

 are the geographical ones. In considering the 

 geography of a country, it seems that the geolo- 

 gical, meteorological, and anthropo-geographical 

 phenomena form an incidental conglomerate, hav- 

 ing no natural tie or relation to one another, 

 while, for instance, the evolutionist's subject of 

 study forms a natural unity. We may be allowed 

 to say that the naturalist demands an objective 

 connection between the phenomena he studies, 

 which the geographical phenomena seem to lack. 

 Their connection seems to be subjective, origi- 

 nating in the mind of the observer. 



Accordingly there are two principal questions 

 which must be answered : first, the one referring 

 to the opposition between physicists and cosmog- 



