140 



SGIEJ^CE. 



[Vol. IX., No. 210 



Joyfully he sees that every process and every phe- 

 nomenon which seem to the stranger an irregular 

 and inconaprehensible conglomerate is a link of a 

 long chain. Losing sight of the single facts, he 

 sees only the beautiful order of the world. 



The cosmographer, on the other hand, holds to 

 the phenomenon which is the object of his study, 

 may it occupy a high or a low rank in the system 

 of physical sciences, and lovingly tries to pene- 

 trate mto its secrets until every feature is plain 

 and clear. This occupation with the object of his 

 affection affords him a delight not inferior to that 

 which the physicist enjoys in his systematical 

 arrangement of the world. 



Our inquiry leads us to the conclusion that it is 

 in vain to search for an answer to the question. 

 Which of the two methods is of a higher value ? 

 as each originates in a different desire of the human 

 mind. An answer can only be subjective, being 

 a confession of the answerer as to which is dearer 

 to him, — his personal feeling towards the phe- 

 nomena surrounding him, or his inclination for 

 abstractions ; whether he prefers to recognize the 

 individuality in the totality, or the totality in the 

 individuality. 



Let us now turn to the discussion of the second 

 point. We have seen that physicists are inclined 

 to acknowledge the value of a certain class of cos- 

 mographical studies. It is the characteristic 

 quality of those phenomena that they are the re- 

 sult of the action of incidental causes upon one 

 group of forces, or upon the elements of phe- 

 nomena. The physicist does not study the whole 

 phenomenon as it represents itself to the human 

 mind, but resolves it into its elements, which he 

 investigates separately. The investigation of the 

 history of these elements of phenomena leads to 

 a systematical arrangement, which gives to the 

 aesthetical desire as much satisfaction as the for- 

 mulation of laws. The end which evolutional and 

 astronomical researches tend to is the best proof 

 of this fact. A study of groups of phenomena, 

 which seem to be connected only in the mind of 

 the observer, and admit of being resolved into 

 their elements, cannot lead to a similar result, and 

 is therefore considered of inferior value. However, 

 we have tried to prove that the source of cosmo- 

 graphical researches is an affective one. If this be 

 right, we cannot distinguish between complex and 

 simple phenomena, as the physicist tries to do, and 

 neglect their subjective unity, — the connection in 

 which they appear to the mind of the observer. 

 The whole phenomenon, and not its elements, is the 

 object of the cosmographer's study. Thus the 

 physiognomy of a country is of no interest to the 

 physicist, while it is important to the cosmog- 

 rapher. 



From the stand-point we occupy, a discussion 

 as to the value of these researches is of just as lit- 

 tle avail as that on the value of the two branches 

 of science, for the judgment will be founded on 

 the mental disposition of the judge, and be only a 

 confession as to which impulse predominates, the 

 aesthetic or the affective. However, one fact 

 appears from our inquiry : cosmography is closely 

 related to the arts, as the way in which the mind is 

 affected by phenomena forms an important branch 

 of the study. It therefore requires a different 

 treatment from that of the physical sciences. 



We will apply these results to the study of 

 geography. Its objects are, the phenomena caused 

 by the distribution of land and water, by the 

 vertical forms of the earth's surface, and by the 

 mutual influence of the earth and its inhabitants 

 upon each other. 



What does the physicist do with this object of 

 study ? He selects a single element out of phe- 

 nomena which are observed at a certain point of 

 the earth's surface, and compares it with another 

 one found at another place. He continues in this 

 way searching for similar phenomena, and loses 

 sight altogether of the spot from which he started. 

 Thus he becomes the founder of the sciences into 

 which geography has gradually been resolved, as 

 his studies are either directed to geological phe- 

 nomena alone, or to meteorological, botanical, or 

 whatever it may be. The most general deductions 

 which can be reached in the pursuit of these studies 

 still have a close connection with the single ob- 

 ject, as they cannot be carried farther than to the 

 most general geographical ideas, as mountain- 

 ranges, running water, oceans, etc. The most 

 general results of his investigations will therefore 

 be a general history of the earth's surface. If he 

 bring these results into a system, he acts, as it 

 seems to us, against the cosmographical character 

 of the science. For instance, a system of all pos- 

 sible actions of water as forming the earth's sur- 

 face seems to us of little value, except from a 

 practical stand-point as being useful in studying 

 the geological history of a district or of the 

 earth's surface. Therefore these systems must be 

 considered as important auxiliary sciences, but 

 they are not geography itself. Their value is 

 founded only on their applicability to the study 

 of geography. The invention of geographical 

 systems, so far as they do not serve this purpose, 

 must be considered as useless, and classifications 

 must be made only as far as geographical phe- 

 nomena of a similar kind must be explained by 

 different causes. 



But there is another branch of geography be- 

 sides this, equal to it in value, — the physiognomy 

 of the earth. It cannot afford a satisfactory ob- 



