March 18, 1887.] 



SCIENCE. 



281 



views, and remarks that "'a man who has not 

 learned the alphabet is usually deficient in a 

 knowledge of grammar. A surgeon who does not 

 know anatomy is not likely to inspire confidence. 

 The philosophical dilettante who plunges into the 

 solution of problems of great importance without 

 scientific preparation may be left to the task of 

 ' drawing out leviathan with a hook,' and one 

 need not be disturbed if his unsuccessful eflfcrts 

 lead him to the conclusion that ' metaphysics ' is 

 obscure, useless, and irreligious." The author 

 then takes up the three ways of viewing meta- 

 physical questions, — the sceptical, the dog- 

 matic, and the critical, — describes each, and im- 

 plicitly accepts for himself the latter method and 

 the stand-point of Kant. In fact, Professor Alex- 

 ander's thought is interesting as illustrating a 

 • return to Kant ' which does not necessarily im- 

 ply a return to Hegel. 



In the seventeen brief chapters which follow, 

 the author formulates according to the critical 

 method some of the most important philosophical 

 difficulties as they appear to him. He does not 

 do this with the intention of prejudicing any par- 

 ticular answer to each, but rather, we suspect, to 

 show that " a year's study of a text-book of men- 

 tal philosophy is not all that is necessary to put a 

 man en rapport with the state of thought in the 

 present." Professor Alexander's use of the formal 

 logic is excellent, and serves to show what a 

 formidable weapon that much-decried science may 

 become in the hands of an experienced craftsman. 

 In no instance, although disjunctions, dilemmas, 

 syllogisms, and enthymemes occur on almost every 

 page, have we come upon any logical slip or fal- 

 facy, though unquestionably specific points in the 

 various arguments maybe disputed on psychologi- 

 cal or metaphysical grounds. 



As an example of the author's method, we quote 

 the conclusion (p. 38) of his chapter on ' The prob- 

 lem of the ultimate nature of matter:' "It is 

 impossible, so far as we know, to separate the fact 

 of force and the fact of causality. One is not 

 found without the other. Wherever there is an 

 effect, there is a manifestation of force. Wher- 

 ever there is a cause, there is an exercise of force. 

 When, therefore, we attempt to explain matter 

 by referring to force, we are obliged to explain 

 force by referring to causality ; and in explaining 

 causality we cannot I'efer to material phenomena, 

 but are obliged to fall back on the a priori law of 

 causality, which is not given by experience." 



On the question of the place of physiological 

 psychology, the author speaks plainly, and, it 

 seems to us, with sound common sense. He re- 

 marks (p. 63) that '• there are two common mis- 

 takes, — one, the denunciation of physiological 



methods by men who have never seen a ganglion- 

 cell ; the other, the denunciation of subjective 

 methods by men who have never given an hour to 

 introspection. It does not appear to be necessary, 

 however, that a knowledge of one set of facts 

 should be incompatible with knowledge of the 

 other set. A combination of th'e two is the ideal 

 psychology." 



It is interesting to find Professor Alexander 

 proving (pp. 64, 65) that "it is possible that it is 

 rational to accept what is irrational because it is 

 more rational to trust the authority for what is 

 thought to be irrational than to place our own 

 reason above such an authority." The admission 

 of this conclusion into the arena of scientific de- 

 bate would be an effectual blow to those self-suffi- 

 cient investigators who find as many criteria of 

 truth as there are minds. . 



We should be glad to point out several other 

 portions of this book that we conceive to be the 

 most interesting, but lack of space forbids this. 

 On the argument by which the author tries to show 

 the atheistic meaning of pantheism (p. 121), how- 

 ever, two points of possible criticism suggest 

 themselves. In showing, that, if a plurality of 

 principles is admitted, pantheism, which admits 

 but one principle, falls. Professor Alexander says, 

 "The existence of human persons with conflicting 

 purposes cannot be explained without asserting 

 (on the pantheistic hypothesis, of course) that 

 there is opposition between the parts of God, i.e., 

 a plurality of principles." Would not the same 

 argument prove that the human ego is plural? 

 For we certainly find conflicting motives and prin- 

 ciples in our own minds. Again, may not the op- 

 position spoken of be only apparent, and the result 

 of our insufficient insight or lack of knowledge ? 

 May it not be a part of a real and higher harmony 

 of which our limited faculties are not cognizant ? 



At the conclusion of the same argument (p. 132), 

 Professor Alexander, having already shown, that, 

 if the pantheistic God is either material or ideal, 

 atheism is the logical consequence, adds, "If the 

 universe, i.e., God, is both material and ideal, 

 then, in so far as God is material, the objection 

 urged as to materialistic pantheism is applicable ; 

 and in so far as God is ideal, the objection ui'ged 

 against idealistic pantheism is applicable." Is 

 this treatment by partition valid? Is it possible 

 to separate a compound, and reason about its vari- 

 ous constituents as separate entities or qualities, 

 and not as parts of another and more complex 

 whole ? It seems to us not. Vv'^e cannot say that 

 water, in so far as it is oxygen, will do thus and 

 so, and, in so far as it is hydrogen, will do some- 

 thing else. Water is a new compound, and it 

 develops new properties as water, which are not 



