1918.] The Tattva-cintamani. 299 
fences Sealyre: | 
Non-existence whose Counterpart is Qualified by a 
Nature abiding in a Different Locus. 
Most of the definitions of invariable concomitance given 
above were defective inasmuch as they did not cover the case 
of an exclusively affirmative inference. They involved such 
phrases as “‘ non-existence of the major term” and “difference 
of locus of the major term”? which could not apply to an ex- 
clusively affirmative inference in which the major term was all- 
pervading. To make the ‘non-existence of the major term”’ 
and ‘‘ difference of locus of the major term” possible, even in 
nameableness as qualified by the nature of a pot.” Though 
nameableness (major term) is all-pervading we have, they say, 
been able to talk of its non-existence by assuming the nature 
of a pot to abide in it (instead of in the pot). 
Gangesa opposes the above view by saying :—(1) That on the 
assumption of a non-existence of this form invariable concomi- 
tance is to be defined as the state in which the middle term 
has not the co-presence with a non-existence whose counterpart 
18 qualified by a nature which is the nature of the major term. 
This definition, in which the counterpart and the major term 
are identical, does not involve a non-existence of the form pro- 
The definitions already condemned cannot also 
Say that there is no hare-horn in a cow. 
re 
The prima facie Definitions of Invariable Concomitance. 
of; Gangesa examines and condemns twelve other definitions 
b invariable concomitance called prima facie definitions given 
Y previous logicians. 
