1918.] The Tattva-cintamani. 301 
fold owing to the difference of their loci such as the fire of a 
kitchen, of a sacrificial ground,and soon. There is non-existence 
tence which abides in the same locus with smoke, altogether 
upsets the conclusive definition. 
Gangesa in reply says that though in the locus of smoke 
there are non-existences of various fires, the natures which 
qualify the counterparts of those non-existences are not one 
and the same, viz. the nature of fire in general. They are 
different, that is, particular fires have particular natures, as for 
instance, the nature of the fire of a kitchen is different from 
that of the fire of a sacrificial ground, and so on. It is therefore 
necessary to admit a non-existence of fire of the general form— 
such as ‘there is no fire’ distinguished from non-existences of 
particular forms as ‘there are not such and such fires.’ A non- 
existence of the general form is the non-existence whose counter- 
part is not of a particular nature. Had the non-existence of 
the general form been a name merely for the sum total of particu- 
lar non-existences then there would not have arisen in us a 
doubt of the form—‘ is not there a colour in air?’ It is perfectly 
known to us that in air there are no particular colours as red, 
yellow, etc.; yet we entertain a doubt in our mind as to whether 
there is not in air a non-existence of colour of the general form. 
faauartH: | 
Invariable Concomitance of Special Forms. 
of smoke of a hill. There is no invariable concomitance of 
smoke with fire if the two occupy different loci, that is, if the 
locus of smoke is different from that of the fire. But nobody can 
eny the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire if the two 
term with the major term which is different from the counter- 
al of that absolute non-existence which does not abide in the 
