304 Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. [N.S., XIV, 
an instance of the former source, we may cite the case of a fire 
which, if wet fuel is attached to it as a condition, may be in- 
separably connected with smoke. In asserting the invariable 
concomitance of smoke with fire! we are therefore in doubt as 
to whether wet fuel is not a condition. 
In certain instances the doubt does not arise at all on 
moved by reasoning as follows :—Had fire constantly accom- 
panied smoke there would have been smoke in an ignit iron- 
ball; but in it there is fire and no smoke; so there is no invarl- 
able concomitance of fire with smoke (but there is that of 
smoke with fire). : 
The reasoning which is to remove doubt, is to be carried 
on only as long as the doubt is not removed. The charge of 
regressus ad infinitum brought against the reasoning employed 
to establish invariable concomitance, does not apply to the pre 
sent case in which reasoning ceases with the disappearance of 
doubt and does not continue up to the commencement of the 
processes establishing invariable concomitance. 
aa | 
Reasoning (or Confutation). 
The processes of reasoning (or confutation) may be ilur 
trated as follows :— : 
Interrogation.—Can smoke abide without fire? | ae 
Reasoning.—If smoke could abide without fire, it wo 
__ not have been a product of fire. 
Re-interrogation.—Is smoke a product of fire ? 
Reasoning.—lf smoke were produced neither 
nor from non-fire, then it would have been @ 
product. But it is not so. «ther 
Doubt—Smoke then may have been produced eiti® 
rom fire or without a cause. : 
Incompatibility —Why a person, who thus indulges : 
doubt, is nevertheless led on to activity ? me 
doubts as to whether an effect may ne A ‘ 
from fire 
noD- 
: ere is invariable concomitance of smoke with fire but ane vice 
with smoke; that is, wherever there is smoke there is fire, bu a 
3a. : 
