agreement with Wolff's opinions about the eighteenth century, 

 represents, to a certain extent, a modernization of his 

 ideology which distorts the historical perspective. 



The connection of Wolff's opinions with philosophical 

 presentations undoubtedly have had an effect on modern 

 science. It has already been noted above that some of his 

 ideology was dependent upon Leibnitz's ideas which were 

 predominant in the eighteenth century. It must be remembered 

 that with Leibnitz's philosophical presentations, the persons 

 opposing Wolff — those who were supporting the idea of 

 preformation — had a greater basis to attack Wolff, because 

 Leibnitz was himself inclined to the idea which he expressed 

 as his idealistic doctrine about the pre-established harmony. 

 In the literature, it was repeatedly noted that K. F. Wolff 

 had learned Leibnitz's ideas from his teacher Christian 

 Wolff, who had tried to reject the most idealistic aspects 

 of the doctrines, in particular the existence of pre- 

 established harmony. As mentioned above, K. F. Wolff himself 

 considered these teachings about the pre-established harmony 

 a philosophical source of the idea of preformation. No, 

 strictly speaking there is no basis to assume that Wolff 

 had accepted Leibnitz's doctrines about monads. In his theory 

 of development, Wolff followed only Leibnitz's ideas on the 

 understanding of the forces or powers as the source of life 

 processes in general, and development or growth in particular, 

 which are central for Leibnitz and his independent successors. 



Apparently, it is not an exaggeration to say that Wolff 

 had made an attempt to establish a special system guided by 

 a concrete study of the manifestations of nature and, above 

 all, the manifestations of life. He could not put his system 

 in order. If Wolff's materialistic tendency in his opinions 

 about the possibility of knowing the world, about the 

 subordination of all its manifestations including all the 

 features of life to natural law, about the subordination of 

 psychical processes to materialistic features and so on are 

 unquestionable, so his fluctuations between materialism and 

 idealism on the question about the moving force of vital 

 processes (2^) are without doubt. In an analogous context, he 

 hurried to make the reservation that the essential force is 

 entirely distinctive and inherent only to the organic body. 

 With his opinions, he sometimes moved close to Stahl's 

 presentations and sometimes decisively shut himself off 

 from them. 



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