ON VITALITY. 



BY THE REV. H. H. HIGGINS. M. A. 



FROM THE PROCKEDINGS OF THE LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF LIVERPOOL, ENGLAND, 18u*. 



There is at present among some very eminent physiologists a growing tendency 

 to deny, or at all events to question, the existence of vitality as distinct from the 

 action of known forces, such as heat, light, electricity, &c., or something anal- 

 ogous to these. 



The views of the physiologists above referred to may thus be briefly stated : 



(1.) Of the nature of vitality we know nothing ; we are, therefore, not required 

 either to admit or to deny its existence as a distinct thing. 



(2.) The observed phenomena of life are consistent with, and, to a very great 

 extent, derivable from, the operation of known laws; it is, therefore, not philo- 

 sophical to introduce an entirely unknown agency to account for such residual 

 phenomena as are not thus reducible. 



The present paper will be devoted to the consideration of some questions 

 bearing upon these two propositions. 



It is a matter of comparatively little importance what term may be chosen to 

 denote the object of our inquiry, whether it be "vitality," or "germ force," or the 

 "vital principle," so that it be clearly understood to refer only to the ultimate 

 element of life, and not to any even of the simplest functions of life. Seen under 

 this aspect, vitality is simply the sine qua non of the animate individual,* whose 

 very existence, as such, stands or falls as vitality is, or is not, regarded as a dis- 

 tinct entity. Personality, which is a higher form of individuality, is equally 

 dependent on the question whether vitality is, or is not, the result of forces such 

 as we are accustomed to deal with in scientific investigations. It would be 

 absurd to call a flame a person or an individual ; yet it has active qualities, a 

 distinct form, requires aliment, &c. A man is not a person because he has these 

 properties, but because he has a something which a flame has not. Whether 

 this something be designated soul, or spirit, or will, or intellect, or vitality, is, I 

 apprehend, all the same in respect of its relation to physical science, which 

 cannot recognize metaphysical distinctions. In fact, it is the question before us, 

 whether on grounds of physical science we are competent to recognize vitality 

 under any aspect as a distinct thing. 



It must be evident that if the vital functions by which man is distinguished 

 from a block of granite be the result of difference in the combination of the pri- 

 mary molecular forces of his living substance, he has no more right to be regarded 

 as a person than has a thunder-storm; his being is a process, and in general 

 terms he may be described as a segregation of certain forces, initiated by a 

 similar combination, and passing away into equilibrium, or into the general stock 

 from whence he was derived. 



* lu assigning this position to vitality the writer is aware of the difficulties which beset the 

 subject, especially in connection with the development of plants, and in respect of the lower 

 forms in the animal kingdom, compound animals, the alternation of generations, «fec. It, 

 however, vitality can be shown to lie beyond the range of scientific investigation, in all these 

 cases the knot is cut ; and while physical development remains in every instance a proper 

 object of scientific inquiry, neither the relations subsisting between the vitality of a seed and 

 that of the parent plant, nor any similar relations, can adequately be discussed as matters 

 pertaining to natural science. 



