﻿The Audubon Societies 



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Grouse shall not be taken or possessed from 

 January ist to October 31st, nor Plover 

 from January ist to July 15th. By Section 

 141. of the statute, the inhibition enacted by 

 the other sections of the statute are made to 

 apply to fish, game or flesh coming from 

 without the state as well as to that taken 

 within the state." 



"We shall not discuss at any length the 

 claim of the relator that the statute con- 

 travenes the constitution of this state as 

 depriving the relator of his property without 

 due process of law. That question has 

 been settled adversely to that claim by the 

 decision of this Court in Phelps vs. Racey 

 (60 N. Y. 10) and People vs. Bootman ( 180 

 N. Y. 1), in which it was held within the 

 power of the legislature, in order to effect 

 the preservation of game within the state, to 

 enact not only a close season during which 

 the possession of such game should be un- 

 lawful, but further to enact that the posses- 

 sion in the state, during such season, of 

 game taken without the state should be 

 equally unlawful." 



"To the argument that the exclusion of 

 foreign game in no way tends to the preser- 

 vation of domestic game, it is sufficient to 

 say that, substantially, the uniform belief of 

 legislature and people is to the contrary, and 

 that both in England and many of the 

 states in this country, legislation prohibiting 

 the possession of foreign game during the 

 close season has been upheld as being neces- 

 sary to the protection of domestic game. 

 The Act of Congress, passed May 25, 

 1900, commonly termed the ' Lacey Act,' 

 empowered the state to enact the legislation 

 before us (Sec. 141)." 



"That Congress can authorize an exercise 

 of the police power by a state, which, with- 

 out such authority, would be an unconstitu- 

 tional interference with commerce, has been 

 expressly decided by the Supreme Court of 

 the United States in Matter of Rahrer ( 140 

 U.S. 545). The question before us is 

 merely the interpretation of the Lacey Act 

 which the learned counsel for the respond- 

 ents contend applies solely to interstate ship- 

 ments and not to importations from foreign 

 countries. The Act is entitled: 'An Act 

 to enlarge the powers of the Department of 



Agriculture, prohibit the transportation by 

 interstate commerce of game killed in viola- 

 tion of local laws, and for other purposes.' 



" The fifth section deals with the transpor- 

 tation into any state of animals killed with- 

 out the state. It is as follows: ' That all 

 dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any foreign 

 game animals, or game- or song-birds, the 

 importation of which is prohibited, or the 

 dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any wild 

 game animals, or game- or song-birds trans- 

 ported into any state or territory, or remain- 

 ing therein for use, consumption, sale or 

 storage therein, shall upon arrival in such 

 state or territory be subject to the operation 

 and effect of the laws of such state or terri- 

 tory enacted in the exercise of its police 

 powers, to the same extent and in the same 

 manner as though such animals or birds 

 had been produced in such state or terri- 

 tory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by 

 reason of being introduced therein in origi- 

 nal packages or otherwise. This act shall 

 not prevent the importation, transportation, 

 or sale of birds or bird plumage, manufac- 

 tured from feathers of barn-yard fowl.'" 



" It is contended that the title of the statute 

 tends to show that the operation of Section 

 5 is confined to shipment from other states, 

 and not to importation from foreign coun- 

 tries. If the title of an act could limit its 

 effect, which it cannot (Potter's ' Dwarrison 

 Statutes,' p. 102), still this claim is without 

 foundation. The fifth section, which is the 

 one before us, deals with an entirely differ- 

 ent matter, — transportation into a state, not 

 out of a state, —and is embraced in the title 

 of the statute only under the designation 

 ' and for other purposes.' As to this sub- 

 ject, therefore, the title in no respect tends 

 to limit the effect of the act. It is difficult 

 to see any season why Congress should have 

 sought to discriminate between bodies of 

 • game, song-birds or wild animals brought 

 into a state from other states and those brought 

 from foreign countries. The object of the 

 legislation was to enable the states, by their 

 local law, to exercise a power over the sub- 

 ject of the preservation of game- and song- 

 birds, which without that legislation they 

 could not exert." 



"Every consideration that led Congress to 



