WILLIAM McDOUGALL 145 



deduce conclusions as to values from their findings, 

 and philosophers have presumed to determine ques- 

 tions of fact by introducing considerations of value; 

 indeed what has commonly been called philosophical 

 treatment of questions of fact and existence is distin- 

 guished from scientific treatment by the introduction, 

 explicitly or surreptitiously, of considerations of value. 

 In other words, the philosopher, in attempting to de- 

 termine questions of existence and reality has been 

 swayed by considerations of value; in trying to say 

 what is, he has allowed his judgment and reasoning 

 to be swayed by considerations of what, as he judges, 

 ought to be. And this confusion of the realms of fact 

 and value, of science and philosophy, has been espe- 

 cially pervasive in the sphere with which this volume 

 is concerned. 



Let me put the matter in another way. Just as 

 there is a science of conduct (which is part of psy- 

 chology) and also a philosophy of conduct, as there 

 is (or may be) a science of aesthetic (the psychology 

 of the beautiful) and also a philosophy of sesthetic, 

 so there is (or may be) a science of religion and also 

 a philosophy of religion. It is for philosophy to show 

 us the values of religious beliefs for mankind; it is 

 for science to weigh the evidence on which those be- 

 liefs are founded and to attempt to reach a conclusion 

 as to the degree of probability attaching to them. To 

 the theologian or to the religiously minded man of 

 science, this strict division of functions may seem a 

 cold-blooded counsel of perfection. Yet in this, as in 

 all other fields, the man of science must strive to be 

 as cold-blooded as possible. 



