n. At Crescent City, stacks of floatable building timber and 

 logs at the lijinber dock proved a great hazard by furnishing 

 flotsam to the waves. 



o. Reinforced concrete, concrete block, and stone-wall 



structures were much less susceptible to tsunami damage, 

 in terms of collapse or displacement, than wooden struc- 

 tures. Generally they survived the tsunami well, but 

 suffered from impact damage, wetting, and cracking under 

 uneven foundation settlement. 



p. Oil storage tanks at the waterfronts were devastated by 

 the tsunami waves at Seward, Valdez, Whittier, and 

 Crescent City. At all of these places, oil fires were 

 started and spread by water, and burned uncontrolled. 

 Oil contamination from spillage and spreading by the 

 waves was serious. At Kodiak City and Kodiak Naval 

 Station, oil tanks were at levels above the reach of 

 the waves, and oil fires did not occur. 



q. The power plant at the Naval Station, Kodiak, was 



vulnerable to flooding, and contamination from heavy 

 fuel oil rendered all machinery inoperable and 

 unsalvable . 



k. General Design Criteria for Tsunami Protection 



a. Safety, Economy and Design 



(l) For any given location subject to attack from tsunamis, 

 a standard of safety and economy needs to be established that 

 takes into account the following factors : 



(a) The degree (magnitude-frequencies) to which the 

 region is seismically active (eg. Figures 3, h, & 5). 



(b) The geological and historical nature of earthquake 

 faulting (eg. Figures 2, 3, & k) . 



(c) The statistical trend of focal depth of local 

 earthquakes in relation to distance from the shore 

 (eg. Figure 6) . 



(d) The exposure of the coast to transocean tsunamis 

 (eg. Figure 27) . 



(e) The protection afforded by offshore islands. 



(f ) The peculiarities of the coastline to concentrate 

 energy in specific places (eg. Figures 72 and 73). 



(g) The resonating capacity of particular bays and 



377 



