134 PSYCHOLOGY. 



"between conception and belief, proof ought to lie. And 

 when Ave ask, ' AVhat })roves that all this is more than a 

 mere conception of the possible ? ' it is not easy to get a 

 sufficient rejjly. If we start from the frog's spinal cord 

 and reason by continuity, saying, as that acts so intelli- 

 gently, though unconscious, so the higher centres, though 

 conscious, may have the intelligence they show quite as 

 mechanically based ; Ave are immediately met by the exact 

 counter-argument from continuity, an argument actually 

 urged by such Avriters as Pfliiger and Lewes, wdiich starts 

 from the acts of the hemispheres, and says : " As these owe 

 their intelligence to the consciousness which we know to 

 be there, so the intelligence of the spinal cord's acts must 

 really be due to the invisible presence of a consciousness 

 lower in degree." All argiiments from continuity Avork in 

 two ways : you can either level up or level doAvn hj their 

 means. And it is clear that such arguments as these can 

 eat each other up to all eternit}'. 



There remains a sort of philosophic faith, bred like 

 most faiths from an {esthetic demand. Mental and physical 

 CA^ents are, on all hands, admitted to present the strongest 

 contrast in the entire field of being. The chasm Avhich 

 yawns betAveen them is less easily bridged OA^er by the 

 mind than any interval AA'e know. Why, then, not call it an 

 absolute chasm, and say not only that the tAvo w^orlds 

 are different, but that they are independent? This giA^es 

 us the comfort of all simple and absolute formulas, and it 

 makes each chain homogeneous to our consideration. 

 "When talking of nerAous tremors and bodily actions, we 

 may feel secure against intrusion from an irrelevant mental 

 world. When, on the other hand, Ave speak of feelings, Ave 

 may with equal consistency use terms always of one de- 

 nomination, and ueA'er be annoyed by Avliat Aristotle calls 

 * slipping into another kind.' The desire on the part of men 

 educated in laboratories not to haAe their physical reason- 

 ings mixed up with such incommensurable factors as feelings 

 is certainly ver}' strong. I have heard a most intelligent 

 biologist say : " It is high time for scientific men to protest 

 against the recognition of any such thing as consciousness 

 in a scientific in\'estigation." In a word, feeling constitute? 



