170 PSYCIIOLOG 7. 



then it coinpntes from tlie aii^le of coiiA'er<^ence of tlie eye- 

 balls that the two retinal images must bo the projection of 

 but a single object; thinlly, it constructs the third dimen- 

 sion and sees this object solid; fourthly, it assigns its dis- 

 tance: and fifthly, in each and all of these operations it gets 

 the objective character of what it 'constructs' by uncon- 

 sciously inferring it as the only possible cause of some sen- 

 sation which it unconsciously feels.* Comment on this 

 seems hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology. 



None of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in 

 proof of the existence of ideas in an unconscious state, 

 prove anything of the sort. They prove either that con- 

 scious ideas were present which the next instant w^ere 

 forgotten ; or they prove that certain results, similar to 

 results of reasoning, may bo wrought out by rapid brain- 

 processes to wdiicli no ideation seems attached. But there 

 is one more argument to be alleged, less obviously insuffi- 

 cient than those which we have reviewed, and demanding 

 a new sort of reply. 



Tenth Proof. There is a great class of experiences in 

 our mental life which may be described as discoveries that 

 a subjective condition which we have been having is really 

 something diiierent from what we had supposed. We sud- 

 denly find ourselves bored by a thing which we thought we 

 were enjoying well enough ; or in love with a person whom 

 we imagined we only liked. Or else w^e deliberately ana- 

 lyze our motives, and find that at bottom they contain 

 jealousies and cupidities which w^e little suspected to be 

 there. Our feelings towards people are perfect w^ells of 

 motivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings 

 to light. And our sensations likewise : we constantly dis- 

 cover new elements in sensations which we have been in 

 the habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which 

 have been there from the first, since otherwise we should 

 have been unable to distinguish the sensations containing 

 them from others nearly allied. The elements must exist, 

 for we use them to discriminate by ; but they must exist in 



* Cf. Satz vom Grunde, pp. .59-65. Compare also F. Zollner's Natui 

 der Komettn, pp. :^42 S.. nnrl 4?" 



