174 PSYCHOLOGY. 



tion, that namely between Jiaving a mental state and know- 

 ing all about it. The truth is here even simpler to unravel. 

 When I decide that I have, without knowing it, been for 

 several weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to a state 

 v\'hich previously I hav3 not named, but which was fully con- 

 scious ; which had no residual mode of being except the 

 manner in which it was conscious ; and which, though it waa 

 a feeling towards the same person for whom I now have a 

 much more inflamed feeling, and though it continuously led 

 into the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the 

 same name, is yet in no sense identical with the latter, and 

 least of all in an ' unconscious ' way. Again, the feelings from 

 our viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of 

 innervation (if such there ) e), and those of muscular exer- 

 tion which, in our spatial judgments, are supposed uncon- 

 sciously to determine what we shall perceive, are just exactly 

 what we feel them, perfectly determinate conscious states, 

 not vague editions of other conscious states. They may be 

 faint and weak ; they may be very vague cognizers of the 

 same realities which other conscious states cognize and name 

 exactly ; they may be unconscious of much in the reality 

 which the other states are conscious of. But that does not 

 make them in themselves a whit dim or vague or uncon- 

 scious. They are eternally as they feel when they exist, 

 and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified with 

 anything else than their own faint selves, A faint feeling 

 may be looked back upon and classified and understood in 

 its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of 

 thought. But it, on the one hand, and the later state ot 

 mind which knows all these things about it, on the other, 

 are surely not two conditions, one conscioiis and the othei 

 * unconscious,' of the same identical psychic fact. It is the 

 destiny of thought tha':, on the whole, our early ideas are 

 superseded by later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same 

 realities. But none the less do the earlier and the later 

 ideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so 

 many several successive states of mind. To believe the con- 

 trar}^ would make any definite science of psychology im- 

 possible. The only identity to be found among our suc- 

 cessive ideas is their similarity of cognitive or representa- 



