THE METHODS AND SNARES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 187 



tive of their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may 

 even do some good.* 



The inaccuracy of introspective ohservation has been made 

 a subject of debate. It is important to gain some fixed 

 ideas on this point before we proceed. 



The commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the Soul 

 or Subject of the mental life is a metaphysical entity, inac- 

 cessible to direct knowledge, and that the various mental 

 states and operations of which we reflectively become 

 aware are objects of an inner sense which does not lay hold 

 of the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hear- 

 ing gives us direct knowledge of matter in itself. From 

 this point of view introspection is, of course, incompetent 

 to lay hold of anything more than the Soul's fhenomena. 

 But even then the question remains. How Avell can it know 

 the phenomena themselves ? 



Some authors take high ground here and claim for it a 

 sort of infallibility. Thus Ueberweg : 



" When a mental image, as such, is the object of my apprehension, 

 there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my con- 

 sciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself) ; 

 for the object apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even 

 exist, as tfie objects of external perception do, in itself outside of my 

 consciousness. It exists only within me." t 



And Brentano : 



" The phenomena inwardly apprehended are true in themselves, 

 As they appear — of this the evidence with which they are apprehended 

 is a warrant — so they are in reality. Who, then, can deny that in this 

 a great superiority of Psychology over the physical sciences comes to 

 light ?" 



And again : 



" No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in 

 himself he, and be so, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this 

 would have reached that finished doubt which destroys itself in de- 

 stroying every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowl- 

 edge.":]: 



Others have gone to the opposite extreme, and main- 

 tained that we can have no introspective cognition of our 



* Compare some remarks in Mill's Logic, bk. i. chap. iii. §§ 2, 3. 

 •{■Logic, § 40. if Psychologic, bk. ii. cliap. iii. §§ 1, 2. 



