THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS. 221 



made clear, so that we may leave it, aud descend to some 

 distinctions of detail. 



There are two kinds of knoivledge broadly and practically 

 distinguishable : we may call them respectively knoivledge 

 of acquaintance and knoidedge-ahout. Most languages ex° 

 press the distinction; thus, yvoovaiy eidevai; noscere, scire; 

 kennen, ivissen; connaHre, savoir.^ I am acquainted with 

 many people and things, which I know very little about, 

 except their presence in the places where I have met them. 

 I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a 

 pear when I taste it ; I know an inch when I move my 

 finger through it ; a second of time, when I feel it pass ; 

 an eifort of attention when I make it ; a difi'erence between 

 two things when I notice it ; but about the inner nature of 

 these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say 

 nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them 

 to any one who has not already made it himself. I cannot 

 describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, 

 define to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just 

 what respect distance is just what it is, and differs from 

 other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, 

 Go to certain places and act in certain w^ays, and these 

 objects will probably come. All the elementary natures of 

 the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter 

 and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist 

 between them, must either not be known at all, or known 

 in this dumb way of acquaintance without knoivledge-about. 

 In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowl- 

 edge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and 

 the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less 

 we analyze a thing, aud the fewer of its relations we per- 

 ceive, the less we know about it and the more our famili- 

 arity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds 

 of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practi- 

 cally exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought 

 of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison 

 with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comjjari- 



* Cf. John Grote : Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60 ; H. Helmholtz. 

 Popular Scientific Lectures, Loudou, p. 308-9. 



