2:?-i risivJioLOGY. 



son with a thought of it .that is more articulate and explicit 



stm. 



The grammatical sentence expresses this. Its 'subject' 

 stands for an object of acquaintance which, by the addition 

 of the predicate, is to get something known about it. We 

 may already know a good deal, when Ave hear the subject 

 named — its name may have rich connotations. But, know 

 we much or little then, we know more still when the sen- 

 tence is done. We can relapse at will into a mere condi- 

 tion of acquaintance with an object by scattering our 

 attention and staring at it in a vacuous trance-like way. 

 We can ascend to knowledge about it by rallying our wits 

 and proceeding to notice and analyze and think. What we 

 are only acquainted with is only present to our minds ; we 

 have it, or the idea of it. But when we know about it, we 

 do more than merely have it ; we seem, as we think over its 

 relations, to subject it to a sort of treatment and to operate 

 upon it with our thought. The words feeling and thought 

 give voice to the antithesis. Through feelings we become 

 acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we 

 know about them. Feelings are the germ and starting 

 point of cognition, thoughts the developed tree. The mini- 

 mum of grammatical subject, of objective presence, of reality 

 known about, the mere beginning of knowledge, must be 

 named by the word that says the least. Such a word is the 

 interjection, as lo ! there! eccol voild ! or the article or 

 demonstrative pronoun introducing the sentence, as the, it, 

 that. In Chapter XII we shall see a little deeper into what 

 this distinction, between the mere mental having or feeling 

 of an object and the thinking of it, portends. 



The mental states usually distinguished as feelings are 

 the emotions, and the sensations we get from skin, muscle, 

 viscus, eye, ear, nose, and palate. The ' thoughts,' as 

 recognized in popular parlance, are the conceptions and 

 judgments. When we treat of these mental states in par- 

 ticular we shall have to say a word about the cognitive 

 function and value of each. It may perhaps be well to 

 notice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with 

 facts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons 



