THE STREAM OF THOVOHT. 249 



Feelings of Teridency. 



So much for the transitive states. But there are other 

 unnamed states or qualities of states that are just as im- 



seems to suppose that it is onl}' in transitive states that outward relations 

 are known; whereas in truth space-relations, relations of contrast, etc., are 

 felt along with their terms, in substantive states as well as in transitive 

 states, as we shall abundantly see. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer's passage is 

 so clear that it also deserves to be quoted in full (Principles of Psychology, 

 § 65): 



" The proximate components of Mind are of two broadly-contrasted 

 kinds — Feelings and the relations between feelings. Among the members 

 of each group there exist multitudinous unlikenesses, many of which are 

 extremely strong; but such unlikenesses are small compared with tho.se 

 which distinguish members of the one group from members of the other. 

 Let U.S, in the first place, consider what are the characters which all Feel- 

 ings have in common, and what are the characters which all Relations 

 between feelings have in common. 



" Each feeling, as we here define it, is any portion of consciousness 

 which occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable individ- 

 uality; which has its individuality marked off from adjacent portions of 

 consciousness by qualitative contrasts; and which, when introspectively 

 contemplated, appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials. 

 Obviously if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decompo.^able 

 into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not 

 one feeling but two or more. Obviously if it is indistinguishable from an 

 adjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one with that portion — is not 

 an individual feeling, but part of one. And obviously if it dots not 

 occupy in consciousness an appreciable area, or an appreciable duration, it 

 cannot be known as a feeling. 



" A Relation between feelings is, on the contrary, characterized by 

 occupying no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away Ihe terms it 

 unites, and it disappears along with them; having no independent place, 

 no individuality of its own. It is true that, under an ultimate analy.sis, 

 "what we call a relation proves to be itself a kind of feeling — the momen- 

 tary feeling accompanying the transition from one conspiciious feeling to 

 an adjacent conspicuous feeling. And it is true that, notwithstanding its 

 extreme brevity, its qualitative character is appreciable; for relations are 

 (as we shall hereafter see) distiugui.shable from one another only by the 

 unlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions. 

 Each relational feeling may. in fact, be regarded as one of those nervous 

 shocks which we suspect to be the units of composition of feelings; and, 

 though instantaneous, it is known as of greater or less strength, and as 

 taking place with greater or less facility. But the contrast between these 

 relational feelings and what we ordinarily call feelings is so strong that 

 we must class them apart. Their extreme brevity, their small variety, and 

 tlieir dependence on the terms they unite, differentiate them in an unmis- 

 takable way. 



" Perhaps it will be well to recognize more fully the truth that this difl« 



