260 PSYCHOLOGY. 



teresting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make oi 

 it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas. 



For the important thing about a train of thought is its 

 conclusion. That is the meaning, or, as we say, the topic of 

 the thought. That is what abides when all its other mem- 

 bers have faded from memory. Usually this conclusion is 

 a word or phrase or particular image, or practical attitude 

 or resolve, whether rising to answer a problem or fill a 

 pre-existing gap that worried us, or whether accidentally 

 stumbled on in revery. In either case it stands out from 

 the other segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar 

 interest attaching to it. This interest arrests it, makes a 

 sort of crisis of it when it comes, induces attention upon it 

 and makes us treat it in a substantive way. 



The parts of the stream that precede these substantive 

 conclusions are but the means of the latter's attainment. 

 And, provided the same conclusion be reached, the means 

 may be as mutable as we like, for the ' meaning ' of the stream 

 of thought will be the same. What difference does it make 

 what the means are ? " Qu'importe le flacon, pourvu qu^on 

 ait Vivresse ?" The relative unimportance of the means 

 appears from the fact that when the conclusion is there, we 

 have always forgotten most of the steps preceding its attain- 

 ment. When we have uttered a proposition, we are rarely 

 able a moment afterwards to recall our exact words, though 

 we can express it in different words easily enough. The 

 practical upshot of a book we read remains with us, though 

 w^e may not recall one of its sentences. 



The only paradox would seem to lie in supposing that 

 the fringe of felt affinity and discord can be the same in 

 two heterogeneous sets of images. Take a train of words 

 passing through the mind and leading to a certain conclu- 

 sion on the one hand, and on the other hand an almost 

 wordless set of tactile, visual and other fancies leading to 

 the same conclusion. Can the halo, fringe, or scheme in 

 which we feel the words to lie be the same as that in which 

 we feel the images to lie ? Does not the discrepancy of 

 terms involve a discrepancy of felt relations among them ? 



If the terms be taken qiid mere sensations, it assur- 

 edly does. For instance, the words may rhyme with each 



