274 PSYCHOLOGY. 



Many philosophers, however, hold that the reflective 

 consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive func- 

 tion of thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know 

 a thing at all, must expressly distinguish between the thing 

 and its own self.* This is a perfectly wanton assumption, 

 and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing 

 it true. As well might I contend that I cannot dream 

 without dreaming that I dream, swear without swearing 

 that I swear, deny without denying that I deny, as main- 

 tain that I cannot know without knowing that I know. I 

 may have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about, 

 an object O without think about myself at all. It suffices 

 for this that I think O, and that it exist. If, in addition 

 to thinking O, I also think that I exist and that I know O, 

 well and good ; I then know one more thing, a fact about O, 

 of which I previously was unmindful. That, however, does 

 not prevent me from having already known O a good deal. 

 O per se, or plus P, are as good objects of knowledge as 

 O plus me is. The philosophers in question simply substi- 

 tute one particular object for all others, and call it tlw ob- 

 ject par excellence. It is a case of the ' psychologist's fal- 

 lacy ' (see p. 197). They know the object to be one thing 



open and X., alias ' Baldy,' fell out on the road. We pulled up at once, 

 and then he said, ' Did anybody fall out?' or 'Who fell out?' — I don't 

 exactly remember the words. When told that Baldy fell out, he said, ' Did 

 Baldy fall out ? Poor Baldy! ' " 



* Kant originated this view. I subjoin a few English statements of it. 

 J. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, Proposition i: "Along with what- 

 ever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its 

 knowledge, have some knowledge of itself." Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discus- 

 sions, p. 47: " We know, and we know that we know, — these propositions, 

 logically distinct, are really identical ; each implies the other. ... So true 

 is the scholastic brocard : non sentiimis nisi sentiamus nos sentire." H. L. 

 Mansel, Metaphysics, p. 58: "Whatever variety of materials may exist 

 within reach of my mind, I can become conscious of them only by recog- 

 nizing them as mine. . . . Relation to the conscious self is thus the perma- 

 nent and universal feature which every state of consciousness as such must 

 exhibit." T. H. Green, Introduction to Hume, p. 13: "A consciousness 

 by the man ... of hinLself, in negative relation to the thing that is his 

 object, and this consciousness must be taken to go along with the percep- 

 tive act itself. Not less than this indeed can be involved in any act that is 

 to be the beginning of knowledge at all. It is the minimum of possible 

 thought or intelligenoe," 



