THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF. 843 



the physiological improbability of a material monad, with 

 thought attached to it, in the brain. But at the end of the 

 chapter we said we should examine the ' Soul ' critically in 

 a later place, to see whether it had any other advantages 

 as a theory over the simple phenomenal notion of a stream 

 of thought accomj)anying a stream of cerebral actiAdty, by 

 a law yet unexplained. 



The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philoso- 

 phy and of scholasticism, which is only jiopular philosophy 

 made systematic. It declares that the principle of individ- 

 uality within us must be substantial, for psychic phenomena 

 are acti^■ities, and there can be no activity without a con- 

 crete agent. This substantial agent cannot be the brain but 

 must be something immaterial ; for its activity, thought, is 

 both immaterial, and takes cognizance of immaterial things, 

 and of material things in general and intelligible, as well as 

 in jDarticular and sensible ways, — all which powers are in- 

 compatible with the nature of matter, of which the brain 

 is comj)osed. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the ac- 

 tivities of the brain are compounded of the elementary ac- 

 tivities of each of its parts. Furthermore, thought is spon- 

 taneous or free, whilst all material activity is determined 

 ab extra ; and the will can turn itself against all corporeal 

 goods and appetites, which would be impossible were it a 

 corporeal function. For these objective reasons the prin- 

 ciple of psychic life must be both immaterial and simple as 

 well as substantial, must be what is called a Soid. The 

 same consequence follows from subjective reasons. Our 

 consciousness of personal identity assures us of our essen- 

 tial simplicity : the owner of the various constituents of the 

 self, as we have seen them, the hypothetical Arch-Ego 

 whom we provisionally conceived as possible, is a real en- 

 tity of whose existence self-consciousness makes us directly 

 aware. No material agent could thus turn round and grasp 

 itself — material activities always grasp something else than 

 the agent. And if a brain could grasp itself and be self- 

 conscious, it would be conscious of itself as a brain and 

 not as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul 

 then exists as a simple spiritual substance in which the 

 various psychic faculties, operations, and affections inhere. 



