346 PSTCHOLOOT. 



occur, has some sort of ground iu the nature of things ? II 

 the workl Soul be understood merely to express that claim, 

 it is a good word to use. But if it be held to do more, 

 to gratify the claim, — for instance, to connect rationally the 

 thought which comes, with the processes which occur, and 

 to mediate intelligibly between their two disparate natures, 

 — then it is an illusory term. It is, in fact, with the word 

 Soul as with the word Substance in general. To say that 

 phenomena inhere in a Substance is at bottom only to 

 record one's protest against the notion that the bare exist- 

 ence of the phenomena is the total truth. A phenomenon 

 w^ould not itself be, we insist, unless there were something 

 moy^e than the phenomenon. To the more we give the pro- 

 visional name of Substance. So, in the present instance, 

 we ought certainly to admit that there is more than the 

 bare fact of coexistence of a passing thought with a 

 passing brain-state. But we do not answer the question 

 * What is that more ? ' when we say that it is a ' Soul ' 

 which the brain-state affects. This kind of more exjolains 

 nothing; and when we are once /trying metaphysical ex- 

 planations we are foolish not to go as far as we can. For my 

 own part I confess that the moment I become metaphysical 

 and try to define the more, I find the notion of some sort of 

 an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a more promis- 

 ing hypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a 

 lot of absolutely indi-vidual souls. Meanwhile, as psycholo- 

 gists, we need not be metaphysical at all. The phenomena 

 are enough, the passing Thought itself is the only verijiable 

 thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process 

 is the ultimate known law. 



To the other arguments which would prove the need of 

 a soul, we may also turn a deaf ear. The argument from 

 free-wdll can convince only those who believe in free-will; 

 and even they will have to admit that spontaneity is just as 

 possible, to say the least, in a temporary spiritual agent 

 like our ' Thought ' as in a permanent one like the supposed 

 Soul. The same is true of the argument from the kinds of 

 things cognized. Even if the brain could not cognize uni- 

 versal, immaterial, or its * Self,' still the ' Thought ' which 

 we have relied upon in our account is not the brain, closely 



