848 FYSCHOLOGY. 



precisely analogous to our knowledge of matter." This 

 analogy of our two ignorances is a favorite remark in the 

 Scotch school. It is but a step to lump them together 

 into a single ignorance, that of the ' Unknowable ' to which 

 any one fond of superfluities in philosophy may accord the 

 hospitality of his belief, if it so please him, but which any 

 one else may as freely ignore and reject. 



The Soul-theory is, then, a complete superfluity, so far 

 as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious 

 experience goes. So far, no one can be compelled to sub- 

 scribe to it for definite scientific reasons. The case would 

 rest here, and the reader be left free to make his choice, 

 were it not for other demands of a more practical kind. 



The first of these is Immortality, for w^hich the simpli- 

 city and substantiality of the Soul seem to offer a solid 

 guarantee. A 'stream' of thought, for aught that we see 

 to be contained in its essence, may come to a full stop at 

 any moment; but a simple substance is incorruptible, and 

 will, by its own inertia, persist in Being so long as the Cre- 

 ator does not by a direct miracle snuff it out. Unques- 

 tionably this is the stronghold of the spiritualistic belief, — 

 as indeed the popular touchstone for all philosophies is the 

 question, "What is their bearing on a future life?" 



The Soul, however, when closely scrutinized, guarantees 

 no immortality of a sort we care for. The enjoyment of the 

 atom-like simplicity of their substance in sacula saculorum, 

 would not to most people seem a consummation devoutly 

 to be wished. The substance must give rise to a stream of 

 consciousness continuous with the present stream, in order 

 to arouse our hope, but of this the mere persistence of the 

 substance per se offers no guarantee. Moreover, in the 

 general advance of our moral ideas, there has come to be 

 something rediculous in the way our forefathers had of 

 grounding their hopes of immortality on the simplicity of 

 their substance. The demand for immortality is nowadays 

 essentially teleological. We believe ourselves immortal 

 because we believe ourselves fit for immortality. A 'sub- 

 stance' ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy 

 to survive; and an insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself, 

 provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized 



