352 FHYViioLouy. 



the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment 

 The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successivelji 

 make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infi- 

 nite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity 

 ill it atone time, nor ide/ititi/ in different ; whatever natural propension 

 we may have to imagine that siinphcity and identity. The comparison 

 of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive percep- 

 tions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant 

 notion of the place where these scenes are represented, nor of the ma- 

 terial of wliich it is composed." 



But Hume, after doing tins good piece of introspective 

 work, proceeds to pour out tiie ciiild with the Latli, and to 

 fly to as great an extreme as the substantialist philosophers. 

 As they say the Self is nothing but Unity, unity abstract and 

 absolute, so Hume says it is nothing but Diversity, diversity 

 abstract and absolute; whereas in truth it is that mixture 

 of unity and diversity which we ourselves have already 

 found so easy to pick apart. We found among the objects 

 of the stream certain feelings that hardly changed, that 

 stood out warm and vivid in the past just as the present 

 feeling does now ; and v/e found the present feeling to be 

 the centre of accretion to vv^hicii, cle proche en proche, these 

 other feelings are, by tJientdging Thought, felt to cling. Hume 

 says nothing of the judging Thought ; and he denies this 

 thread of resemblance, this core of sameness running 

 through the ingredients of the Self, to exist even as a phe- 

 nomenal thing. To him there is no tertium quid betw-een 

 pure unity and pure separateness. A succession of ideas 

 " connected by a close relation affords to an accurate view 

 as perfect a notion of diversity as if there was no manner 

 of relation" at all. 



"All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind 

 never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our 

 perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the 

 mtnd perceive some real connectio7i among them, there would be no 

 difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a 

 sceptic and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. 

 J pretend not, however, to pronounce it insuperable. Others, perhaps, 

 . . may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile these con- 

 tradictions." * 



* Appendix to book i of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. 



