ATTENTION. 439 



our atteution's ' strain ' under tlie circumstances. Let us 

 show how universally present in our acts of attention this 

 reinforcing imagination, this inward reproduction, this an- 

 ticipatory thinking of the thing we attend to, is. 



It must as a matter of course be present when the atten- 

 tion is of the intellectual variety, for the thing attended to 

 then is nothing but an idea, an inward reproduction or con- 

 ception. If then we prove ideal construction of the object 

 to be present in sensorial attention, it will be present every- 

 where. When, however, sensorial attention is at its height, 

 it is impossible to tell how much of the j)ercept comes from 

 without and how much from within ; but if we find that the 

 'preparation we make for it always partly consists of the 

 creation of an imaginary duplicate of the object in the mind, 

 which shall stand ready to receive the outward impression 

 as if in a matrix, that will be quite enough to establish the 

 point in dispute. 



In Wundt's and Exner's experiments quoted above, the 

 lying in wait for the impressions, and the preparation to 

 react, consist of nothing but the anticipatory imagination 

 of what the impressions or the reactions are to be. Where 

 the stimulus is unknown and the reaction undetermined, 

 time is lost, because no stable image can under such cir- 

 cumstances be formed in advance. But where both nature 

 and time of signal and reaction are foretold, so completely 

 does the expectant attention consist in premonitory imagina- 

 tion that, as we have seen (pp. 341, note, 373, 377), it may 

 mimic the intensity of realit}^ or at any rate produce 

 reality's motor effects. It is impossible to read Wundt's 

 and Exner's pages of description and not to interpret the 

 'Apperception ' and ' Spannung ' and other terms as equiva- 

 lents of imaginatio7i. With Wundt, in particular, the word 

 Apperception (which he sets great store by) is quite inter- 

 changeable with both imagination and attention. All three 

 are names for the excitement from within of ideational 

 brain-ceiitres, for which Mr. Lewes's name oi preperception 

 seems the best possible designation. 



Where the impression to be caught is very weak, the 

 way not to miss it is to sharpen our attention for it by pre- 

 liminary contact with it in a stronger form. 



