DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON. 503 



* integration,' ' synthesis,' or what not. But by direct intro- 

 spection no analysis of them is ever made. A conspicuous 

 case will come to view when we treat of the emotions. 

 Every emotion has its ' expression,' of quick breathing, 

 palpitating heart, flushed face, or the like. The expression 

 gives rise to bodily feelings ; and the emotion is thus neces- 

 sarily and invariably accompanied by these bodily feelings. 

 The consequence is that it is impossible to appreliend it as 

 a spiritual state by itself, or to analyze it away from the 

 lower feelings in question. It is in fact impossible to j^rove 

 that it exists as a distinct psychic fact. The present writer 

 strongly doubts that it does so exist. But those Avho are 

 most firmly persuaded of its existence must wait, to prove 

 their point, until they can quote some as yet unfound patho- 

 logical case of an individual who shall have emotions in a 

 body in which either complete paralysis will have prevented 

 their expression, or complete anaesthesia will have made 

 the latter unfelt. 



In general, then, if an object affects us simultaneously 

 in a number of ways, abed, we get a peculiar integral impres- 

 sion, which thereafter characterizes to our mind the individ- 

 uality of that object, and becomes the sign of its presence ; 

 and which is only resolved into a, b, c, d, respectively by 

 the aid of farther experiences. These we now may turn to 

 consider. 



If any single quality or constihient, o, of such an object, have 

 previously been knoicn by us isolatedly, or have in anj other 

 manner already become an object of separate acquaintance 

 on our part, so that we have an image of it, distinct or vague, 

 in our mind, disconnected with bed, then that constituent a 

 7nay be analyzed out from the total impression. Analysis of 

 a thing means separate attention to each of its parts. In 

 Chapter XI we saw that one condition of attending to a thing 

 was the formation from within of a separate image of that 

 thing, which should, as it were, go out to meet the impres- 

 sion received. Attention being the condition of analysis, 

 and separate imagination being the condition of attention, 

 it follows also that separate imagination is the condition of 

 analysis. Only such elements as we are acquainted ivith, and 

 can imagine, separately, can be discriminated ivithin a total 



