ASSOCIATION. 555 



In toucli we have a smaller number of instances, tlionsrh 

 probably every one who bathes himself in a certain fixed 

 manner is familiar with the fact that each part of his body 

 over which the water is squeezed from the sponge awakens 

 a premonitory tingling consciousness in that portion of skin 

 which is habitually the next to be deluged. Tastes and 

 smells form no very habitual series in our experience. But 

 even if they did, it is doubtful whether habit would fix the 

 order of their reproduction quite so well as it does that of 

 other sensations. In vision, however, we have a sense in 

 which the order of reproduced things is very nearly as 

 much influenced by habit as is the order of remembered 

 sounds. Rooms, landscapes, buildings, pictures, or persons 

 with whose look we are very familiar, surge up before the 

 mind's eye with all the details of their appearance complete, 

 so soon as we think of any one of their component jDarts. 

 Some persons, in reciting printed matter by heart, will 

 seem to see each successive word, before they utter it, ap- 

 pear in its order on an imaginary page. A certain chess- 

 player, one of those heroes who train themselves to play 

 several games at once blindfold, is reported to say that in 

 bed at night after a match the games are played all over 

 again before his mental eye, each board being pictured as 

 passing in turn through each of its successive stages. In 

 this case, of course, the intense previous voluntary strain 

 of the power of visual representation is what facilitated the 

 fixed order of revival. 



Association occurs as amply between impressions of 

 different senses as between homogeneous sensations. Seen 

 things and heard things cohere with each other, and with 

 odors and tastes, in representation, in the same order in 

 which they cohered as impressions of the outer world. 

 Feelings of contact reproduce similarly the sights, sounds, 

 and tastes with which experience has associated them. In 

 fact, the ' objects ' of our perception, as trees, men, houses, 

 microscopes, of which the real world seems composed, are 

 nothing but clusters of qualities which through simulta- 

 neous stimulation have so coalesced that the moment one 

 is excited actually it serves as a sign or cue for the idea of 

 the others to arise. Let a person enter his room in the 



