ASSOCIATION. 699 



strong, and steadfast association of tlie image of that thing 

 with some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation 

 persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind. 



Judgment is ' transferring the idea of truth by associ- 

 ation from one proposition to another that resembles it.'* 



Reasoning is the perception that " whatever has any mark 

 has that which it is a mark of " ; in the concrete case the 

 mark or middle term being always associated with each of 

 the other terms and so serving as a link by which they are 

 themselves indirectly associated together. This same kind 

 of transfer of a sensible experience associated with another 

 to a third also associated with that other, serves to explain 

 emotional facts. When we are pleased or hurt we express, 

 it, and the expression associates itself with the feeling. 

 Hearing the same expression from another revives the as- 

 sociated feeling, and we sympathize, i.e. grieve or are glad 

 with him. 



The other social affections. Benevolence, Conscientiouness, 

 Ambition, etc., arise in like manner by the transfer of the 

 bodily pleasure experienced as a reward for social service, 

 and hence associated with it, to the act of service itself, the 

 link of reward being dropped out. Just so Avarice when 

 the miser transfers the bodily pleasures associated with 

 the spending of money to the money itself, dropping the 

 link of spending. 



Fear is a transfer of the bodily hurt associated by ex- 

 perience with the thing feared, to the thought of the thing, 

 with the precise features of the hurt left out. Thus we fear 

 a dog without distinctly imagining his bite. 



Love is the association of the agreeableness of certain 

 sensible experiences with the idea of the object capable of 

 affording them. The experiences themselves may cease to 

 be distinctly imagined after the notion of their pleasure has 

 been transferred to the object, constituting our love there- 

 for. 



Volition is the association of ideas of muscular motion 

 with the ideas of those pleasures which the motion pro- 

 duces. The motion at first occurs automatically and results 



* Priestley, op. cit. p. xxx. 



