THE PERCEPTION OF TIME. 637 



it to be perceived immediately, and then the second event can be per- 

 ceived only after a certain time of latency, during which the attention 

 reaches its effective maximum for it and diminishes for the first event. 

 In this case the events are perceived as two, and in successive order — 

 that is, as separated by a time-interval in which attention is not suflBcient- 

 ly accommodated to either to bring a distinct perception about. . . . 

 While we are hurrying from one to the other, everything between them 

 vanishes in the twilight of general consciousness. " * 



One might call this the law of discontinuous succession in 

 time, of percepts to ivhich ive cannot easily attend at once. Each 

 percept then requires a separate brain-process ; and when 

 one brain-process is at its maximum, the other would ap- 

 pear perforce to be in either a waning or a waxing phase. 

 If our theory of the time-feeling be true, emj)tj time must 

 then subjectively appear to separate the two jDercepts, no 

 matter how close together they may objectively be ; for, 

 according to that theory, the feeling of a time-duration is 

 the immediate effect of such an overlapping of brain-pro- 



*I leave my text as it was printed before Milnsterberg's essay appeared 

 (see above page 620, note). He denies that we measure any but minimal 

 durations by the amount of fading in the ideational processes, and talUs 

 almost exclusively of our feelings of muscular tension in his account, 

 whereas I have made no mention of such things in mine. I cannot, liov/- 

 ever, see that there is any conflict between what he and I suggest. I smu 

 mainly concerned with the consciousness of duration regarded as a speciMc 

 sort of object, he is concerned with this object's measurement exclusively. 

 Feelings of teusionmiglit be the means of the measurement, whilst overlap- 

 ping processes of any and every kind gave the object to be measured. The 

 accommodative and respiratory movements from which the feelings of 

 tension come form regularly recurring sensations divided by their ' phases ' 

 into intervals as- definite as those by which a yardstick is divided b}" the 

 marks upon its length. 



Let a', a'^ a^. a^ be homologous phases in four successive movements 

 of this kind. If four outer stimuli 1, 2, 3, 4, coincide each with one of 

 these successive phases, then their ' distances apart ' are felt as equal, other- 

 wise not. But there is no reason whatever to suppose that the mere over- 

 lapping of the brain-process of 2 by the fading process of 1, or that of 3 by 

 that of 2, etc., does not give the characteristic quality of content which we 

 call ' distance apart ' in this experience, and which by aid of the muscular 

 feelings gets judged to be equal. Doubtless the muscular feelings can 

 give us the object ' time ' as well as its measure, because their earlier 

 phases leave fading sensations which constantly overlap the vivid sensation 

 of the present phase. But it would be contrarj- to analog)' to suppose that 

 they should be the only experiences which give this object. I do not 

 understand Herr Miinsterberg to claim this for them. He takes our 

 wnse of time for granted, and only discusses its measurement. 



