650 PSYCHOLOGY. 



independent events, each snug in its own skin. Yesterday's 

 feeling is dead and buried ; and the presence of to-day's is 

 no reason wliy it should resuscitate. A farther condition 

 is required before the present image can be held to stand 

 for a past original. 



That condition is that the fact imaged be expressly referred 

 to the past, thought as in the past. But how can we think 

 a thing as in the past, except by thinking of the past to- 

 gether with the thing, and of the relation of the two ? And 

 how can we think of the past ? In the chapter on Time-per- 

 ception we have seen that our intuitive or immediate con- 

 sciousness of pastness hardly carries us more than a few 

 seconds backward of the present instant of time. Bemoter 

 dates are conceived, not perceived ; known symbolically by 

 names, such as ' last week,' ' 1850 ; ' or thought of by events 

 which happened in them, as the year in which we attended 

 such a school, or met with such a loss. — So that if we wish 

 to think of a particular past epoch, we must think of a name 

 or other symbol, or else of certain concrete events, associated 

 thereAvithal. Both must be thought of, to think the past 

 epoch adequately. And to ' refer ' any special fact to the 

 past epoch is to think that fact ivith, the names and events 

 which characterize its date, to think it, in short, with a lot 

 of contiguous associates. 



But even this would not be memory. Memory requires 

 more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be 

 dated in my past. In other words, I must think that I di- 

 rectly experienced its occurrence. It must have that 

 ' wai'mth and intimacy ' which were so often spoken of in 

 the chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences 



* appropriated ' by the thinker as his own. 



A general feeling of the past direction in time, then, a 

 particular date conceived as lying along that direction, and 

 defined by its name or phenomenal contents, an event im- 

 agined as located therein, and owned as part of my ex- 

 perience, — such are the elements of every act of memory. 



It follows that what we began by calling the * image,' or 



* copy,' of the fact in the mind, is really not there at all in 

 that simple shape, as a separate 'idea.' Or at least, if it be 

 there as a separate idea, no memory will go with it. iWhat 



