MEMORY. 651 



memory goes with is, on the contrary, a very complex rep- 

 resentation, that of the fact to be recalled pZw5 its associates, 

 the Avhole forming one ' object ' (as explained on page 275, 

 Chapter IX), known in one integral pulse of consciousness 

 (as set forth on pp. 276 ff.) and demanding probably a 

 vastly more intricate brain-process than that on which any 

 simple sensorial image depends. 



Most psychologists have given a perfectly clear analysis 

 of the phenomenon we describe. Christian WolflF, for ex- 

 ample, writes: 



"Suppose you have seen Mevius in the temple, but now afresh in 

 Titus' house. 1 say you recognize Mevius, that is, are conscious of hav- 

 ing seen him before, because, although now you perceive him with your 

 senses along with Titus' house, your imagination produces an image of him 

 along with one of the temple, and of the acts of your own mind reflecting 

 on Mevius in the temple. Hence the idea of Mevius which is reproduced in 

 sense is contained in another series of perceptions than that which 

 formerly contained it, and this difference is the reason why we are con- 

 .scious of having had it before. . . . For whilst now you see Mevius in 

 the house of Titus, your imagination places him in the temple, and 

 renders you conscious of the state of mind which you found in yourself 

 when you beheld him there. By this you know that you have seen him 

 before, that is, you recognize him. But you recognize him because his 

 idea is now contained in another series of perceptions from that in which 

 you first saw him." * 



Similarly James Mill writes : 



" In ray remembrance of George III., addressing the two houses of 

 parliament, there is, first of all, the mere idea, or simple apprehension, 

 the conception, as it is sometimes called, of the objects. There is com- 

 bined with this, to make it memory, my idea of my having seen and 

 heard those objects. And this combination is .so close that it is not in 

 my power to separate them. I cannot have tlie idea of George III. ; 

 his person and attitude, the paper he held in his hand, the sound of his 

 voice while reading from it ; without having the other idea along with 

 it, that of my having been a witness of the scene. ... If this ex- 

 planation of the case in which we remember sensations is understood, 

 the explanation of the case in which we remember ideas cannot occasion 

 much of difficulty. I have a lively recollection of Polyphemus's cave, 

 and the actions of Ulysses and the Cyclops, as described by Homer. In 

 this recollection there is, first of all, the ideas, or simple conceptions of 

 the objects and acts ; and along with these ideas, and so closely com- 



* Psychologia Empirica, § 174. 



