MEMORY. 673 



images is also derived from the first. As every sensation tends to re- 

 f ive in its image, the sensation twice repeated will leave after it a double 

 tendency, that is, provided tlie attention be as great the second time as 

 the first ; usually this is not the case, for, the novelty diminishing, the 

 interest diminishes ; but if other circumstances renew the interest, or if 

 the will renovates the attention, the incessantly increasing tendency 

 will incessantly increase the chances of the resurrection and integrity 

 ^* the image."* 



If a phenomenon is met with, however, too often, and 

 with too great a variety of contexts, although its image is 

 retained and reproduced with correspondingly great facil- 

 ity, it fails to come up with any one particular setting, and 

 the projection of it backwards to a particular past date 

 consequently does not come about. We recognize but do 

 not remember it — its associates form too confused a cloud. 

 No one is said to remember, says Mr. Spencer, 



"that the object at which he looks has an opposite side -, or that a cer- 

 tain modification of the visual imj)ression implies a certain distance ; 

 or that the thing he sees moving about is a live animal. To ask a man 

 whether he remembers that the sun shines, that fire burns, that iron is 

 hard, would be a misuse of language. Even the almost fortuitous con- 

 nections among our experiences cease to be classed as memories when 

 they have become thoroughly familiar. Though, on hearing the voice 

 of some unseen person slightly known to us, we say we recollect to 

 whom the voice belongs, we do not use the same expression respecting 

 the voices of those with whom we live. The meanings of words wliich 

 in childhood have to be consciously recalled seem in adult life to be 

 immediately present." f 



These are cases where too many paths, leading to too 

 diverse associates, block each other's way, and all that the 

 mind gets along with its object is a fringe of felt familiarity 

 or sense that there are associates. A similar result comes 

 about when a definite setting is only nascently aroused. We 

 then feel that we have seen the object already, but when or 

 where we cannot say, though we may seem to ourselves to 

 be on the brink of saying it. That nascent cerebral excita- 

 tions can effect consciousness with a sort of sense of the 

 imminence of that which stronger excitations would muke 

 us definitely feel, is obvious from what happens wheu we 



* On Intelligence, i. 77-83. 

 t Psychology, § 201. 



